Name: Why Russia Will Always Want to Dominate Georgia
Uploaded: 2026-03-14T17:07:42.000Z
Duration: 34 min 24 s
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Adverbs of manner

As the devastating war in Ukraine continues grinding on without a clear end in sight, tensions are rapidly rising in another nation that borders Russia, who the Kremlin has previously invaded twice in only the past three decades.

Adverbs of degree

In May of 2024, hundreds of thousands of Georgian citizens took to the streets in their nation's capital, Tbilisi, to protest against their government's passing of a new and highly controversial law in the country.

The ruling party that governs in Georgia, the Georgian Dream Party, officially refers to this new law as the Transparency of Foreign Influence Bill.

Once it enters in a law, the bill will require all NGOs and media companies operating in Georgia who receive more than 20% of their funding from abroad to register themselves as pursuing the interests of a foreign power in a public registry.

The Georgian Dream Party argues that this bill is necessary to provide transparency on where NGOs and media companies in Georgia are receiving their funding from.

But critics and opponents of the bill argue that it's almost identical to a similar law that was passed by Vladimir Putin's government in Russia back in 2012, which has enabled the Russian government ever since to suppress, crack down on, and

shut down opposition media outlets and NGOs in the country, a pattern that could be replicated by the Georgian Dream Party to suppress the opposition in Georgia too.

For this reason, opponents of the foreign influence bill have labeled it as the Russian law.

But it's not the only reason why they've been calling it that, because the bill's passing likely also carries with it tremendous geopolitical benefits for the Kremlin too, because it'll probably prevent Georgia from becoming accepted into the European Union and NATO as well.

Both the EU and NATO have repeatedly stressed that Georgia's passing of the new Foreign Influence Bill will make them incompatible with their values, and

that it will jeopardize Georgia's membership prospects.

As a result, for decades, most Georgians have long aspired to become a member of both blocs of nations, with current polling showing that almost 80% of the Georgian population desires their country to join the European Union, and

another poll showing that roughly 87% of Georgians see the ongoing war in Ukraine as a shared cause, having themselves been invaded by Russia twice in the past three decades that resulted in 20% of their own internationally recognized territory falling under Russian military occupation.

It was only a few months ago, in December of 2023, when Georgia was finally offered its long awaited and much coveted candidacy status by the European Union, which if one day approved into a fully fledged member state, would establish a disconnected chunk of the European Union across the Black Sea over in Western Asia, wedged in between Russia and Turkey, which would also make Georgia the fifth EU member state to share a direct border with Russia after Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Finland.

But it was only four months after Georgia received its EU candidacy status that the ruling Georgia Dream Party decided to reintroduce their controversial foreign influence law again.

You see, the party had originally introduced the bill back in February of 2023, but

after fierce protests erupted in the capital city against it, the the bill was quickly withdrawn.

However, the Georgian government's response to the protesters has been significantly more heavy handed than they ever were before, involving water cannons, tear gas and even rubber bullets, as the Georgian Dream Party has made it explicitly clear that they are determined to pass the new law through regardless of how unpopular it might be and regardless of how much it jeopardizes their ability to actually join the EU and NATO.

There is therefore a major concern growing that the Georgian government is actively drifting the country back into the orbit of Russia again, a concern that hasn't been helped by many other of the government's actions recently, such as their arrest and imprisonment of the former pro Western Georgian president and Ukrainian citizen Mikhail Saakashvili Since 2021, their refusal to participate in any sanctions on Russia since the invasion of Ukraine, their resumption of direct air travel with Russia since 2023 and their dramatically increased trade volume with Russia since the invasion of Ukraine started with with Georgian exports to Russia rising by nearly 7% in 2022 and Georgian imports from Russia skyrocketing by 79% over the same time period.

This has led the Ukrainian government to frequently criticize the Georgian government of assisting the Russians in evading sanctions, and

tensions between them have gotten so high recently that Kyiv recalled their ambassador to Tbilisi in June of 2022 and then shortly after Georgia resumed the direct flights with Russia in 2023, Kiev even expelled the Georgian ambassador from their country and announced sanctions on Georgian airways as a consequence.

And then later In September of 2023, the speaker of the Georgian parliament even asserted that Ukraine was plotting a coup in Georgia to overthrow the Georgian Dream Party and push the country into the war with Russia.

Since then, the Georgian government has repeatedly accused both the United States and Ukraine of attempting to push Georgia into joining the war against Russia to reclaim their occupied territories and to open up a second front for the Kremlin to have to deal with.

And they've even gone so far as to openly accuse the US of plotting a coup in the country and fomenting the current high levels of unrest going on against them.

And all of this is increasingly coming to the delight of Russia, who has openly praised the ruling Georgian Dream Party and its new foreign influence bill.

While they still occupy 20% of Georgia's internationally recognized territory, Russia has also long maintained its own policy of keeping Georgia out of the EU and NATO as much as possible, just like they've done in Ukraine.

Because like Ukraine, Georgia occupies an extremely important piece on the board of global geopolitics, especially from the perspective of Moscow.

It is a space that both the west and Russia want to control and keep within their own respective camps for a plethora of important reasons and in order to understand why, it helps to begin with sheer geography.

Georgia is often considered to be a transcontinental country because it exists at the hard to define crossroads between Eastern Europe and Western Asia.

The country's claimed territory straddles most of the greater Caucasus Mountain range, historically a valuable geographic frontier region separating the vast flat Eurasian steppe in southern Russia from the great empires that emerged in Western Asia, like the Turks and the Persians.

The region of the Caucasus has long been a battleground area for influence in the center between all three of these greater neighboring empires around it.

And so for centuries, the Russians have maintained a strong policy of controlling at least the greater Caucasus Mountains in order to control all of the access points from Western Asia into southern Russia, where it's basically just flat, easily traversable land all the way from there to Ukraine and Volgograd, which if captured, would isolate Russia from the Black and Caspian Seas.

Geographically speaking, there are really only 4 viable overland transportation routes to take to travel through or around the greater Caucasus Mountains.

Today there are the two narrow coastal approaches to the west and east of the mountains between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea, while the only two routes in between that run through or over the mountains are the Georgian military road here that follows the traditional mountain pass route used by invaders and merchants for centuries, and

the nearby Roki Tunnel, a tunnel pass going through the mountains that was only built during the Soviet era and completed in 1984.

If all four of these routes can be effectively controlled by Russia, then they can essentially control all land based travel between Western Asia and Russia.

And so they can block any hostile land army from advancing from this direction into the exposed steppe of southern Russia that is significantly more challenging to defend.

Historically, this was Russia's primary concern with controlling the area around the Greater Caucasus Mountains, which included Georgia.

Georgia was steadily annexed by the Russians in the early 19th century in a piecemeal fashion, and

then remained within the Russian Empire until the country collapsed during the first world war in 1917.

Georgia then managed to briefly emerge as an independent republic before it was swallowed back up again by the red army in 1921 and incorporated into the new Soviet Union.

Georgia was then, as it still is today, an ethnically and linguistically diverse place.

Because of its mountainous geography, the Georgians were by far the largest single group and always made up a majority.

But there were large minorities of Azerbaijanis, Armenians, Russians, Greeks, in two important lesser known groups known as the Ossetians and the Abkhazians.

The Ossetians are a disconnected Iranian ethnic group more closely related to Kurds and Persians than any of their neighbors who straddle the border between Russia and Georgia, while the Abkhazians are a small Caucasian ethnic group most closely related to the Circassians to the north.

In Russia, after the Soviet Union came to control the region, they established the Georgian Soviet Republic as a full Union republic of the country.

But within this republic they also created the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast and the Abkhaz Autonomous Republic as well, which each maintained a high degree of autonomy separate from the rest of Georgia.

This is how things largely remained within Georgia for decades, until the Soviet Union began collapsing in 1989 and Georgian, Ossetian and Abkhaz nationalism all began increasing in the ensuing power vacuum.

At the time, the majority of Abkhaz and Ossetians wished to remain within the Soviet Union in order to remain closer to their Ossetian and Circassian kin in Russia.

While the Georgians generally desired outright independence, Moscow began strategically supporting the South Ossetian and Abkhaz nationalist and separatist movements in order to apply leverage against the Greater Georgian Independence movement.

And then, as tensions continued building the local Georgian Soviet government unilaterally revoked the autonomy of south Ossetia in 1990 without receiving approval from Moscow.

The fighting erupted between the South Ossetians and the Abkhaz and the Georgian government.

And after Georgia declared their independence from the Soviet Union in early 1991, the fighting in Abkhazia and South Ossetia transformed into separatist rebellions that the Russian government began actively supporting with arms and volunteers.

By 1993, the Russian Support to the Abkhaz and South Ossetian separatists had proved decisive, with separatist forces managing to secure control over the majority of the former autonomous regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia during and after the war.

In Abkhazia in particular, the Abkhaz side perpetrated a mass ethnic cleansing campaign of the region's Georgian population.

More than 200,000 ethnic Georgians were forcefully expelled at gunpoint from Abkhazia into the rest of Georgia, while more than 5,000 others were massacred by Abkhaz paramilitaries, which severely altered Abkhazia's demographics.

Georgians plummeted from 45.7% of Abkhazia's population in 1989 to fewer than 18% by 2011, while the Abkhaz population rose from only 18% to about 51% of the total population over the same time period.

Despite this, however, Georgia initially aligned itself closer to Russia by joining the Moscow led defense alliance known as the Commonwealth of Independent States at the end of 1993 before withdrawing only half a decade later in 1999 along with Azerbaijan and then after Vladimir Putin came to power as Russia's president in 2000, Russia began pursuing a more forward policy towards the separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

With Georgia out of the CSTF know, he led Russia into imposing a visa regime on Georgia at the end of 2000 and starting in 2002 he led Russia into rolling out a massive passport program to the residents of South Ossetia and Abkhazia without the Georgian government's approval, granting roughly 90% of each of their population's Russian passports and increasing Russian territorial claims to the regions in the process.

Anger and resentment towards Georgia's conciliatory foreign policy to Russia along with lingering political corruption and poverty mounted and eventually culminated with the Rose revolution revolution of 2003, which overthrew the previous corrupt government led by Eduard Shevardnadse and catapulted the extremely pro Western Mikhail Saakashvili into power as the country's next president instead, which radically altered Georgia's geopolitical alignment.

The previous Georgian government had announced their intention to join NATO the year before the revolution in 2002 as Russia began giving passports to the residents in South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

But the Cashvili was passionately adamant about Georgia's future in both NATO and the European Union, and

he vowed that his top foreign policy priority was returning full Georgian control over the separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia once again.

And so, to help align Georgia more with the west and increase their odds of becoming accepted into NATO in the eu, Saakashvili led the country into sending large numbers of Georgian soldiers to support the US war efforts in both Iraq and Afghanistan.

By 2008, Georgia had 2,300 of their soldiers deployed to Iraq, the third highest number of all the states in the international coalition, behind only the United States and the United Kingdom themselves.

While in Afghanistan, Georgia became the largest non NATO and by far the largest per capita troop contributor, with more than 1,500 soldiers deployed there by 2012.

In total, between 2004 and 2021, more than 20,000 Georgian service members served in Afghanistan, while 32 Georgian servicemen were killed in action and another 435 wounded in the country.

Georgia's outsized contributions to Iraq and Afghanistan were of course, deliberately crafted by Saakashvili's government to try and sway American and Western support for Georgia's admission to NATO and the European Union in order to help Georgia eventually reassert its own control over their separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia again.

But it wasn't just Georgia's military support in Iraq and Afghanistan that was making the country more attractive to the west either.

It was also the increasingly valuable space that they occupied.

You see the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 opened up for the first time the massive oil and gas fields of the Caspian Sea basin to the western world.

Approximately 3% of the world's oil reserves and about 7% of the world's natural gas reserves are found here around the Caspian.

And while it used to all be dominated by the Soviets and blocked off from the west, the Soviet collapse placed the keys of the Caspian Sea's oil and gas resources into the hands of newly independent states like Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan.

Just about every major Western energy company you can think of began moving into the region across the 1990s to break themselves into the brand new market.

But they quickly found that it was going to be geographically difficult to transport the region's energy resources from the landlocked Caspian Sea to markets far away in Europe.

Initially, every oil and gas pipeline from the Caspian Sea ran through Russia first, a legacy of Russia's dominance over these countries during the Soviet era.

The Western energy companies wanted to construct their own oil and gas pipelines from the Caspian region that led back to Europe.

But they wanted to avoid routing any of those pipelines through Iran to the south or through Russia to the north.

The pipelines could either go from the Caspian Sea through Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey towards Europe, or they could go from the Caspian Sea through Azerbaijan, Armenia and Turkey towards Europe instead.

But at the time, Azerbaijan and Armenia had a very serious territorial dispute going on over the status of Nagorno Karabakh, and

the two were effectively locked in a frozen war with one another.

Azerbaijan refused to consider allowing this new export route to travel through their arch geopolitical rival.

And so, to avoid Armenia, the Western energy companies, along with Azerbaijan in Turkey, decided to route their new Caspian oil export pipeline north through Georgia instead.

Completed in 2005, the new Baku, Tbilisi, Seyhan oil pipeline enabled Azerbaijan to export their oil supplies through Georgia and Turkey towards the Turkish port of Ceyhan, where oil tankers carry the oil the rest of the way across the Mediterranean to markets all across Europe.

The new route enabled Europe to lessen their dependence on oil imports coming in from the Middle east and Russia.

And that gave Georgia's location, controlling the center of the route, a newfound strategic value to the Europeans.

And then everything began finally coming to a head in 2008.

In February of that year, Kosovo unilaterally declared its independence from Serbia.

After being fully controlled by separatist forces for nearly the past decade, Kosovo's independence was almost immediately recognized by virtually every single Western country.

then, seizing on the precedent they believed had set, Abkhazia and South Ossetia each submitted a formal request to Russia to officially recognize their own independence from Georgia.

And then the month after that, In April of 2008, came the NATO summit in Bucharest, during which NATO's leaders publicly made promises that Georgia would one day soon be officially offered an invitation to join the alliance.

But this prospect of Georgia entering into NATO horrified the Russians and was interpreted by Moscow as a firm red line that shouldn't be crossed.

If Georgia flipped from being within Russia's CSTO military alliance to NATO, then Georgia would likely be supported by NATO into helping the Saakashvili government regain control over all of the separatist controlled parts of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which would then place NATO forces largely in control over three of the four primary entrances into the steppes of southern Russia.

When Factoring in Turkey, NATO's border with Russia would be extended continuously all the way to the Greater Caucasus Mountains themselves, while the eastern rim of the Black Sea would be extended under NATO maritime control to position NATO maritime and air assets precipitously close by to the Russian port of Novorossiysk, which is the second most significant naval base for the Russian Black Sea fleet after Sevastopol in Crimea.

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Why Russia Will Always Want to Dominate Georgia

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