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  • It's hugely disappointing for investors  or more so devastating for investors.

  • It was definitely a surprise and a shock.

  • It signals a terrible thing about the industry.

  • The collapse of FTX shook crypto to its core. The once $32 billion exchange,

  • established in 2019, filed for bankruptcy in November 2022.

  • I'm in contact at the moment with about 60 different investors who

  • have come to me seeking legal advice.

  • Louise Abbott is a partner at U.K. law firm Keystone Law. She specializes

  • in recovering crypto assets on behalf of victims of fraud.

  • It covers people that have invested £2,000 right through to a lady who

  • invested £5 million. It's a very broad range of people who have invested.

  • FTX had the semblance of a blue-chip crypto company,

  • rivaling exchanges like Binance and Coinbase. It even brought on board

  • some of the wealthiest names in Silicon Valley and Wall Street as investors.

  • Ultimately though, reality hit home for FTX and its millions of users,

  • who saw billions of dollars vanish overnight.

  • So, what went wrong with FTX, and does it spell trouble for crypto's other trading platforms?

  • Like a typical stock exchange, FTX was a venue connecting buyers and sellers of an asset

  • in this case, digital currencies like bitcoin, plus a type of financial contract known as derivatives.

  • However, as we've come to learn, FTX did a little more than that. Reports suggest the

  • company dipped into client accounts to make risky trades through its sister firm Alameda Research.

  • Some customers wired their funds directly to Alameda to transfer it to their

  • FTX trading account, sparking concerns over a potential muddling of funds by FTX and Alameda.

  • FTX also had its own token called FTT. It acted a lot like a loyalty scheme,

  • granting traders perks such as discounts off their trading fees. Alameda held a lot of FTT,

  • according to one report, and even used the token as collateral for loans from other crypto

  • companies. This sparked fears over FTX's financial health. A tweet on Nov 6 from the CEO of rival

  • firm Binance, that it was selling most of its FTT holdings, sent the token's value spiraling.

  • That in turn caused customers to flee FTX in large numbers. In a surprise twist,

  • Binance offered to acquire FTX on November 9, only to back out a day later

  • after getting a look inside the company's books. On November 11,

  • FTX filed for bankruptcy protection, and its chief Sam Bankman-Fried stepped down.

  • Bankman-Fried was arrested on December 13 by the Bahamas authorities after the

  • U.S. government filed criminal charges to hold him to account.

  • For Oleg Fomenko, co-founder of fitness-focused crypto network

  • Sweat Economy, FTX's insolvency meant the likely loss of over

  • $400,000 worth of cryptocurrencies including USDC, tether and his company's own token, sweat.

  • Of course, the panic for our liquidity, and how we were affected. We knew that it would

  • be just sort of in low hundreds of 1,000s. It's an amount that makes me swear probably

  • every day, but it's not an amount that is going to make our project suffer.

  • Sweat Economy held these funds on FTX through two of its market makers. Market makers act

  • as the middlemen in trades between buyers and sellers. So, if someone wants to buy or sell a

  • token for instance, they aren't left waiting for the person on the other side of the trade.

  • This $400,000 that we had on FTX was liquidity that we had with two

  • market makers at the time when they cut their withdrawals. We tried to withdraw,  

  • but there was a sort of long, long, long queue, and then they completely cut them.

  • 2022 exposed a deep interconnectedness in the crypto ecosystem not seen in previous

  • market cycles. Companies engaged in risky lending practices, taking customer funds, and investing

  • them elsewhere in search of sky-high yields. They posted illiquid, volatile tokens as collateral.

  • The result? Several high-profile collapses and a resulting contagion impacting a vast

  • set of companies with exposure to those failed firms. FTX is the most notable case so far.

  • FTX is a falldown from Terra Luna. And there has been contagion from that moment

  • onwards. There might be actually exposures that are in more traditional finance.

  • Marieke Flament is CEO of the Near Foundation, which is behind a blockchain network called Near.

  • Her company was among the firms caught up in the fallout from FTX.

  • The impact for Near and Near foundation is actually extremely limited.

  • The amount of money that we raised, which is $500 million between January and April of this year,

  • all of that is actually in fiat and held in bank accounts.

  • Still, she was shocked when she found out about FTX's troubles.

  • As an industry, we already had a first shock with Terra Luna, which is, oh my god, you know,

  • this is systemic. It felt quite contained. But it was still a first

  • warning in the industry. And therefore, what are the repercussions of that?

  • Bosses of other exchanges have since sought to reassure investors that

  • their platforms aren't at risk of facing the same problems as FTX.

  • We are very concerned about anyone using the token they create for leverage,

  • as a collateral. At Binance we don't do that.

  • How should customers think about CRON and your business? This is your own currency.

  • We've never utilized it in a way that FTX did. We never used this as collateral 

  • for any loans or anything. We run a very simple business.

  • Captains of the industry are really  not there to move the industry forward,  

  • they're there to nefariously enrich themselves.

  • After FTX's insolvency, investors were left wondering which domino will fall next.

  • One example was crypto lender BlockFi,

  • which entered bankruptcy after revealing exposure to Bankman-Fried's empire.

  • Now, attention is turning to other trading and  lending firms, including Gemini and Genesis.

  • I don't think all the dominoes have fallen  out from the contagion of what's been

  • happening. The impact that this will have is that a lot of projects actually are not

  • going to have the funds, and therefore the resources for them to continue.

  • To counter the risk of contagion, investors began moving their assets away from exchanges.

  • The number of bitcoins on exchanges fell from its peak of 3.1 million

  • in 2020 to around 2.2 million at the end of 2022.

  • The amount of ether on exchanges sank from 34 million to 18 million in the same period.

  • Some investors are seeking safety incoldhardware wallets rather than

  • centralized exchanges. This one, from Paris-based company Ledger,

  • is designed to make that process more intuitive than it is currently.

  • There is a saying, which is: 'not your keys,

  • not your coins.' And the magic of crypto, is that you can hold it in your hand.

  • For seven years, our company has had the same premise, which is security and self-custody of

  • crypto assets. A year ago, when I was telling people that they shouldn't keep their crypto

  • with centralized exchanges, they would treat me as if I was trying to convert them to veganism.

  • Nothing's too big to fail. And that's actually the point of crypto, right?

  • If not self-custody, why crypto?

  • For their part, exchanges are taking steps to increase transparency throughproof of reserves,”

  • mechanisms that show they have enough assets available to backstop customer withdrawals.

  • This involves taking a cryptographic snapshot of the coins and tokens held by a crypto exchange.

  • But proof of reserves only offers a snapshot of an exchange's assets at a single point

  • in time. Critics say this provides an incomplete picture of these businesses' financial health.

  • There's also a lot of talk around being audited, and then it comes as like,

  • what's the right timeframe and timing to actually do these things?

  • On most crypto exchanges - even Coinbase, the only publicly traded crypto exchange - customers

  • are treated asunsecured creditors,” a categorization that puts them in the same

  • bucket as business suppliers and contractors. If an exchange fails, customers aren't entitled to

  • any government-guaranteed compensation, unlike with regulated brokers or banks.

  • But that could be about to change. Governments in the U.S.,

  • European Union and the U.K. are introducing frameworks to clean up these markets.

  • The demise of FTX - and other cryptoplatforms - has added urgency to those efforts.

  • I think we are already seeing a lack of confidence. People need

  • to see that there's steps being taken to regulate it. If we are

  • able to offer some regulation, we will build confidence.

  • So, is it curtains for crypto exchanges? Most experts believe they'll continue

  • to play a rolebut their survival will be determined by how seriously

  • they take risk management, governance and regulation.

  • I think crypto is here to stay. Crypto is still going to be popular eventually.

  • It is part of our future. And it can be a good thing.

  • Long term, it's good for the industry, because  it exposes bad actors, fraud, and, you know,  

  • this kind of fake value proposition of get rich quick with centralised value propositions.

  • 2023 may be the year that crypto winter ends - however,

  • there's no crystal ball to tell when the ice will finally thaw.

  • I feel that we probably have six to nine months before things will start kind of going on the up.

  • We believe that every business needs to be ready for this market to continue up to 24 months.

It's hugely disappointing for investors  or more so devastating for investors.

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