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  • MALE SPEAKER: Hello, everyone.

  • Welcome to today's talk.

  • We have a very, very special guest today.

  • And I couldn't be more pleased.

  • In thinking about an introduction for him,

  • I quickly realized there's nothing that's

  • going to beat his own words.

  • So I'm going to share a couple of snippets from his writings

  • over the years.

  • And as I do so, think about what would be your guess when

  • he wrote them.

  • So here's one.

  • The bottom line is that many of the investors setting

  • the prices in today's markets don't care about valuation.

  • I get no sense, at all, that the analysts and portfolio

  • managers backing the large cap growth

  • stocks and internet high flyers can imagine

  • prices at which they would be mere holds or, heaven forbid,

  • sells.

  • When do you think this was written?

  • AUDIENCE: [INAUDIBLE].

  • MALE SPEAKER: This was '99.

  • So yeah, there's something to say about the timeliness

  • of what our guest writes.

  • And here's one more.

  • This is from the last 10 years.

  • In the end, buyers took out the biggest mortgage possible

  • given their incomes and prevailing interest rates.

  • Such mortgages would land them in the houses of their dreams

  • and would leave them there as long

  • as conditions did not deteriorate,

  • which they invariably do.

  • Anyway you slice it, standards for mortgage loans

  • have dropped in recent years and risk has increased.

  • Logic based?

  • Perhaps.

  • Cycle induced and exacerbated?

  • I'd say so.

  • Certainly, mortgage lending was made riskier.

  • We'll see in a few years whether that

  • was intelligent risk taking or excessive competitive order.

  • When was this?

  • AUDIENCE: [INAUDIBLE].

  • MALE SPEAKER: This was 2007.

  • And we are a few years from there.

  • And we've seen what happened.

  • So I'm sure all of you want to know what's on our guests

  • mind today.

  • And we are so fortunate that he's here with us in person.

  • So without any further ado, ladies and gentlemen,

  • please join me in welcoming the one and only Howard Marks.

  • [APPLAUSE]

  • HOWARD MARKS: Well that's quite an induction

  • and [INAUDIBLE] puts a lot of pressure on me

  • that I have to be right.

  • So it's hard.

  • But I'm really excited to be here.

  • I want to thank [INAUDIBLE] for setting up this event.

  • And he's worked very hard to make

  • it go well for you and for me.

  • And I hope it'll be fun for all of us.

  • And because I get the impression here at Google

  • that fun is important.

  • Right?

  • AUDIENCE: Absolutely.

  • HOWARD MARKS: So there aren't too many things in life

  • that are worth doing if they can't be fun.

  • As you know, I wrote a book in 2011

  • called the most important thing.

  • And the reason it has that title is because I would find myself

  • in my client's office.

  • And I would say the most important thing in investing

  • is controlling risk.

  • And then five minutes later, I would say the most important

  • thing is to buy at a low price.

  • And five minutes later, I would say the most important thing

  • is to act as a contrarian.

  • So back in 2003, I believe, I wrote

  • a memo called The Most Important Thing.

  • I listed 19 things.

  • Each of which was the most important thing.

  • And then I used that.

  • I couldn't think of a better format for my book.

  • So I used the same format in 2011.

  • Interestingly, some of the things are different.

  • That goes to show you that one's thinking should still be alive

  • and should still evolve.

  • And I know that [INAUDIBLE] and some of the other fellows

  • went to see Charlie Munger speak in Los Angeles

  • this week at age 91.

  • And I'm sure he's still evolving and getting younger.

  • So I'm going to try to do the same.

  • Now I should tell you, and I don't know if you know this,

  • but I write memos to the clients.

  • And I'll refer to a lot of memos in this session, probably.

  • And they're all available on oaktreecapital.com website.

  • And the price is right.

  • They're all free.

  • And I've been sending them out now 25 years.

  • I started in 1990.

  • And I got a letter from a guy named

  • Warren Buffet in 2009 or '10.

  • And he said, if you'll write a book,

  • I'll give you a quote for the jacket.

  • So I had been planning on writing a book when

  • I retired from work.

  • But Buffet's promise caused me to accelerate my time frame.

  • And what the book is is-- who here has read it?

  • OK, about half.

  • So what the book is, it's a recitation

  • of my investment philosophy.

  • And as it says in the forward to the philosophy, which

  • I took the forward-- I don't know about you,

  • I never read the forwards books.

  • But I took the forward to mine very seriously.

  • And what it says in there-- it's not

  • designed to tell you how to make money.

  • And it's not designed to tell you how easy investment is

  • or to try to make it easy.

  • And in fact, my highest gold is probably

  • to make it clear how hard it is.

  • Investing is very difficult because it's,

  • kind of, counter intuitive.

  • And it, kind of, turns back on itself all the time.

  • And there are no formulas that work.

  • So what I tried to do in the book

  • is teach people how to think.

  • Now the thoughts they should hold change from time to time.

  • But how to think, I think, is valid in the long term.

  • And it's my invest philosophy.

  • And I wasn't born with an investment philosophy.

  • You'll hear from a lot of people,

  • if you're interested in investing, he'll say, well,

  • I started reading prospectuses at age eight, and I didn't.

  • Or you know, at 13, I invested my bar mitzvah money,

  • which I didn't do.

  • But in fact, when I was getting out of graduate school-- age

  • 23 in 1969 so I know you can all do the math--

  • I didn't know what I wanted to do.

  • I had studied finance at Wharton and accounting at Chicago.

  • And I knew I wanted to do something in finance.

  • But I wasn't very specific.

  • So I interviewed in five or six different fields.

  • Large consulting firms, small consulting firm,

  • accounting firm, corporate treasury,

  • investment management, investment banking, six, so I

  • ended up in the investment business.

  • Why?

  • Because I had a summer job in '68

  • at city in the investment research department and I

  • liked it.

  • I had fun, right.

  • That's a good reason.

  • So I went there.

  • And by the way, interestingly, there

  • was nothing magical about working in the investment

  • business at that time.

  • It paid the same as all the rest.

  • All six jobs that I was offered had the same pay.

  • Between 12.5 and 14 a year, not a month.

  • And there were no famous investors at the time.

  • Investing was not a household word.

  • There were no investment TV shows.

  • So I just did it because I liked it.

  • I liked the people.

  • And I thought that the investing was intellectually interesting.

  • So I didn't have a philosophy then when I started.

  • And I had some things I had learned in school.

  • But I think that your philosophy-- your philosophy--

  • as opposed to somebody if you studied

  • Descartes or Locke or somebody like

  • that, you learn his philosophy.

  • You might learn a philosophy by studying a religion.

  • But that's not your philosophy.

  • Your philosophy will come from the combination

  • of what you have been taught by your teachers

  • and parents and your experiences and what your experiences tell

  • you about the things you were taught

  • and how they have to be modified.

  • So I developed my philosophy.

  • It might seem like I started writing the memos a long time

  • ago-- 25 years-- but I had been working already

  • over two decades, at that time.

  • So I think that the integration of real life into philosophy

  • is essential.

  • Now I prepared a few slides for today.

  • And basically, the slides are here

  • to illustrate where philosophy came from.

  • Talk to you about some of the foundations and roots.

  • So I call it origins and inspirations.

  • And I hope you'll find it interesting.

  • So first of all, not in order chronologically

  • but, hopefully, in order to try to make something intelligible.

  • Fooled by Randomness, by Nassim Nicholas Taleb.

  • Now who here has read that?

  • All right, more people than have read my book.

  • And I think it's very important.

  • I think it's an excellent book with very, very

  • important ideas.

  • Now don't tell Nassim I said this,

  • but I tell all the people I speak to that it is either

  • the most important badly written book or the worst written very

  • important book that you'll ever read.

  • I think it's not very clear.

  • And I think it's not-- well, maybe

  • there's no attempt to make it clear.

  • But I think a lot of the ideas are very important and even

  • profound, in my opinion.

  • So among other things, and the basic theme

  • is that in investing there's a lot of randomness.

  • And if you look at investing as a field

  • without randomness where everything is determinative,

  • you'll get confused because you will not

  • draw the proper inferences from what you see.

  • For example, just a brief example, you see somebody

  • and they report a great return for the year.

  • The scientist who thinks that the investment world runs

  • like the world of physics might think, well,

  • great return, that means the guy's a great investor.

  • But in truth, it might be somebody who took a crazy shot

  • and got lucky.

  • Why?

  • Because there's a lot of randomness in the world.

  • When I went to Wharton in 1963, the first book

  • I remember learning was called Decision Making

  • Under Uncertainty, by C. Jackson Greyson who

  • became, as I recall, America's first energy czar.

  • And I learned a couple important things from that book.

  • Number one, that you can't tell from an outcome

  • whether a decision was good or bad.

  • It's very important.

  • Most people don't understand this.

  • Totally counter intuitive.

  • But the truth is, in the real world

  • where there's randomness at work-- I mean,

  • if you build a bridge and it falls down,

  • then you must assume that the engineer made

  • a mistake that it was a bad decision

  • to build the bridge that way.

  • But in the real world of where there's randomness,

  • good decisions fail to work all the time.

  • Bad decisions work all the time.

  • The investment business is full of people who are, quote,

  • right for the wrong reason.

  • Made a bad decision, it didn't work out the way they thought,

  • but they got lucky.

  • And they were bailed out by events.

  • So this is very important.

  • And this is the basic theme of "Fooled By Randomness,"

  • Taleb's first book.

  • Since then, he has written the black swan, which

  • became more famous, but I don't think is as good a book.

  • And he's written a book called anti fragile.

  • And that one didn't get famous.

  • But I think that this book is something everybody should read

  • it if you have an interest in numbers, investing,

  • and how the world works.

  • So as I say, the book is all about the role played by luck.

  • And basically, even if you know what's most likely,

  • many other things can happen instead.

  • This is very, very important.

  • We talked earlier at lunch about what's

  • the most important lesson you can draw.

  • Well, of course, I'll never say most important to anything.

  • But one very important lesson for you to learn

  • is that you should not act as if the things that should happen

  • are the things that will happen.

  • Again, in the world of the physical sciences,

  • you could probably bet that that's true.

  • And the electrical engineer knows

  • that if he turns on a light switch over here,

  • the light will go on there every time because it's

  • subject to physics.

  • Not in the world of investing.

  • So for every possible phenomenon,

  • There is a range of things that can happen.

  • There may be one where it's possible to discern

  • which one is the most likely.

  • And if we draw a probability distribution,

  • that may be the highest point on the distribution.

  • The most likely single outcome but that

  • doesn't mean it's going to happen.

  • And the reason we don't have many probability distributions

  • that look like this but rather that

  • look like this is because a range of things can happen.

  • And it's very, very important to notice

  • that, number one, there are lots of things that can happen.

  • So you have to allow for them.

  • And number two, the thing that is most likely to happen

  • is far from sure to happen.

  • So that's very key.

  • There's a professor at the London Business School

  • who put it so simply.

  • He said risk means more things can happen than will happen.

  • And again, this is profound in my opinion.

  • In the economic world, people generally

  • make decisions based on something

  • called expected value, which is to say that you multiply

  • every possible outcome.

  • First of all, of course, you don't think

  • in terms of a single outcome.

  • You think in terms of a range of outcomes.

  • So you take every-- if you could iterate over

  • so many-- you take every possible outcome,

  • you multiply it by the likelihood that it'll happen,

  • you sum the results, and then you

  • get something called the expected value

  • from that course of action.

  • And you choose your course of action

  • based on the highest expected value.

  • And that sounds like a totally rational thing.

  • But what if the course of action that you're considering

  • has some outcomes that you absolutely can't withstand?

  • Then you may not do it.

  • You may not do the highest expected value course of action

  • because it has some you can't live with, you know.

  • Who here is willing to be the skydiver who

  • was right 98% of the time?

  • You know, for example.

  • So you may elect to do bike riding on the Google campus

  • rather than skydiving, even though skydiving is more

  • exhilarating 98% of the time.

  • Anyway, so the point is as I lived my life from learning

  • about [INAUDIBLE] learning about Taleb,

  • from learning from my own experience,

  • I realized that should does not equal will.

  • Lots of things that should happen fail to happen.

  • And even if they don't fail to happen,

  • they fail to happen on schedule.

  • So the thing that the economist or the financier thinks

  • should happen this year may happen in three years.

  • And you got to live three years to see it happen.

  • One of my favorite sayings is never forget

  • the six foot tall man who drowned

  • crossing the stream that was five feet deep on average.

  • We can't live by the averages.

  • We can't say, well, I'm happy to survive on average.

  • We got to survive on the bad days.

  • And if you're a decision maker, you

  • have to survive long enough for the correctness

  • of your decision to become evidence.

  • And you can't count on it happening right away.

  • I always remind people overpriced

  • is not the same as going down tomorrow.

  • And if you bear that simple truth in mind,

  • I think it helps.

  • So Taleb and the role of lock luck, very important.

  • Then John Kenneth Galbraith.

  • John Kenneth Galbraith, for those of you

  • who are not familiar with ancient history,

  • was an American economist.

  • Died around '05, I think, maybe a little after and at the age

  • of about 98 and he was one of my favorites.

  • He was a little on the left side.

  • He was somewhere between free enterprise and socialism.

  • But he was what we call a liberal in the days

  • when it was OK to say that word.

  • But he was very, very smart.

  • And he was not famous as an economist.

  • But he played a lot of roles in government.

  • And he was a diplomat.

  • But he wrote some very good books.

  • And one of them is called A Short History

  • Of Financial Euphoria.

  • And I like thin books.

  • And his is thin.

  • Especially the ones he wrote in the last decade or two

  • of his life were very thin.

  • So I enjoyed those.

  • But the short history is very good,

  • and I'll recommend that to you.

  • And one of the things he says is we have

  • two classes of forecasters.

  • The ones who don't know and the ones who don't know they

  • don't know.

  • Now I don't believe in forecasts, macro forecasts.

  • People who forecast interest rates, performance

  • of economies, and performance of stock markets.

  • And I don't think that my efforts

  • to be a superior investor and most other people's are

  • aided by macro forecasts.

  • So am I saying that the forecaster is never right?

  • No, I'm not saying that.

  • The forecasters are often right.

  • Last year, GDP grew 2%.

  • Many forecasters forecast that GDP will grow this year at 2%.

  • That's called extrapolation.

  • And usually, in economics, extrapolation works.

  • Usually, the future looks like the recent past.

  • So usually, the people who forecast a continuation

  • of the current are right.

  • The only problem is they don't make any money.

  • Because let's take the economy-- most people

  • forecast two something for this year.

  • A growth rate of two something is

  • cooked into the prices of securities today.

  • If the growth rate turns out to be two something,

  • everybody who forecasted that would be right.

  • But security prices will not change much

  • because that two something growth

  • was anticipated and discounted a year or two ago.

  • So all those people who are right won't make any money.

  • So that's correct.

  • So extrapolation works all the time.

  • Forecasts that are extrapolations

  • work all the time, but they don't make any money.

  • Logically, am I saying that forecasts never make any money?

  • No.

  • The forecasts that make money are the forecasts

  • of radical change.

  • If everybody's predicting 2.4% growth for this year

  • and if I predict minus 2 and it turns out to be minus 2

  • or I predict six and it turns out to be six,

  • I'll make a lot of money.

  • So forecasts which are not extrapolations-- forecasts

  • which are radically different from the recent past--

  • are potentially very valuable if they're correct.

  • Of course, they do not have any value if they're incorrect.

  • And if they're incorrect, they'll

  • cost you a lot of money.

  • If everybody else thinks it's going to be 2.4

  • and you predict six and it turns out at 2.4,

  • you're probably going to have taken the wrong investments

  • and lost a lot of money.

  • So deviant forecasts, which turn out to be right,

  • are potentially very valuable but it's

  • very hard to make them.

  • It's very hard to make them correctly.

  • It's very hard to make the correctly consistently.

  • And somebody at lunch mentioned an early memo I wrote

  • called the value of forecasts.

  • And in one, there was the value of forecast

  • and then there was the value of forecasts two, I think, right.

  • And in one of those, I reviewed the history,

  • the recent history, of the Wall Street Journal poll.

  • Every six months, the Wall Street Journal

  • publishes the results of a poll of economists

  • on GDP growths, CPI, the value of $1, price of oil,

  • whatever it might be, a bunch of phenomena.

  • They do it consistently.

  • And they ask ask, like, 30 people consistently over time.

  • So it shows, basically, that most

  • of the time when people get it right

  • it's because they predicted extrapolation and nothing

  • changed.

  • Once in awhile, something changes radically.

  • And invariably, somebody predicted it.

  • But the problem is, if you look at that person's

  • other forecasts over the years, you

  • see that that person always made radical forecasts

  • and never was right any other time.

  • So of course, if you're getting your information

  • from a forecaster, the fact that he was right once

  • doesn't tell you anything.

  • The views of that forecaster would not

  • be of any value to you unless he was right consistently.

  • And nobody's right consistently in making deviant forecasts.

  • So the bottom line for me is their forecasting

  • is not valuable.

  • And that's something that my experience has told me.

  • So we don't know what's going to happen

  • and randomness will play a big role in what happens.

  • And randomness is, by definition, unpredictable.

  • Number three, The Losers Game, by Charlie Ellis.

  • This is very interesting.

  • Anybody here know the name of the company TRW?

  • A few people.

  • TRW used to be a big conglomerate.

  • And now it's known primarily for credit scores.

  • And there was a guy named Si Ramo.

  • He was the R.

  • It was Thompson, Ramo, Wooldridge.

  • And he was the R in TRW and very smart.

  • And Si Ramo wrote a book.

  • And it was about winning at tennis.

  • Who here plays tennis?

  • OK, this is good because as I go around the world now,

  • very few people play tennis anymore.

  • But what Ramo said is that there are two kinds of winning tennis

  • players.

  • If you look at Pete Sampras, or Nadal, or Djokovic,

  • how do they win?

  • The winning champion tennis player

  • wins by hitting winning shots.

  • Hits shots that the opponent can't return.

  • They're either so well placed, or so strategic, or so fast

  • and hard that the opponent can't return them.

  • And if Nadal hits a shot, which is not a potential winner,

  • then his opponent can probably put it away

  • because it doesn't have enough difficulty on the ball.

  • So the championship tennis player wins by hitting winners.

  • You play tennis, right?

  • How do you win?

  • Do you win?

  • AUDIENCE: Sometimes.

  • HOWARD MARKS: How do you win?

  • AUDIENCE: If I win, it's by not hitting it out.

  • HOWARD MARKS: That's right.

  • The amateur tennis player like him and me,

  • we win not by hitting winners but by avoiding hitting losers.

  • And we believe that if we can just push it back 20 times

  • and just get it over the net 20 times,

  • our opponent can only do it 19.

  • We believe that we'll out-steady him, outlast him,

  • and eventually he'll hit it into the net or off the court.

  • We'll win the point.

  • But we'll win the point without having hit a winner.

  • So there are obviously two styles of tennis.

  • So the same is true for investing.

  • So Charlie Ellis wrote an article called The Losers Game.

  • And he said he thought that investing-- so championship

  • tennis is a winners game.

  • It's won by winners.

  • He thought amateur tennis is a losers game.

  • It's won by the people who avoid being losers.

  • Charlie thinks or thought that investing is a losers game.

  • So the best way to win at investing

  • is by not hitting losers.

  • Now I believe also that it's a losers game.

  • Not as much as Charlie believes and not for the same reason.

  • Charlie believes that investing is a losers game

  • because the market is efficient and securities

  • are priced right.

  • I believe there are inefficiencies.

  • I just think it's hard to consistently take

  • advantage of them.

  • And you have to be an exceptional person

  • to take advantage of them on a consistent basis.

  • And the reason that the pro can go for winners

  • is because he is so well schooled

  • and practiced and steady and talented that he knows

  • that if he does this with his foot

  • and this with this hip and this with his elbow and this

  • with his wrist that the ball will go where he wants.

  • He doesn't worry about miscues, wind, sun in his eyes,

  • or distraction.

  • He's so well schooled.

  • In fact, in scoring tennis matches,

  • they keep track of something called unforced errors.

  • And the reason they keep track of them

  • is because there are so few.

  • The pro doesn't make a lot of unforced errors.

  • We make unforced errors all the time.

  • So in order to survive, we have to avoid them.

  • So the point is, if you're going to be an investor,

  • you have to decide am I good enough to go for winners,

  • or should I emphasize the avoidance

  • of losers in my approach?

  • So I say here that the difficulty of getting it right

  • is what makes defensive investing

  • so important because it's just for us

  • in investing, especially because there's randomness,

  • if we do the right thing with our foot and hip and arm

  • and elbow, we're not going to get a winner every time.

  • And then the fourth origin that I wanted to talk about today

  • was my meeting with Mike Milken in November 1978.

  • So in '78, I got a call from my boss at Citibank.

  • And he said, there's some guy in California named Mike Milken,

  • and he deals with something called high yield bonds.

  • Can you figure out what that means

  • because one of our clients had asked for a high yield bond

  • portfolio.

  • And in that day, nobody knew about it.

  • It was unknown.

  • So I met with Mike in November of 1978.

  • He came to see me at Citi in New York.

  • He was looking for clients.

  • He was just starting off in the high yield bond industry.

  • And there was a great meeting.

  • And he explained to me that if you buy AAA bonds,

  • there's only one way to go.

  • AAA bonds are bonds that everybody thinks a great.

  • There companies are making a lot of money.

  • They have prudent balance sheets.

  • The outlook is good.

  • Everything's perfect.

  • So if everything's perfect, that means it can't get better.

  • And if it can't get better, that means it can only get worse.

  • It doesn't have to get worse.

  • But if there is a change, it's going to be for the worse.

  • And if you've bought a bond on the assumption

  • that it's perfect and it gets worse, then you lose money.

  • So that's important.

  • On the other hand, he said, if you buy single-B bonds

  • and they survive, there's only one way for them to go,

  • which is upgrade.

  • Now that's not exactly true because they

  • can default and go bankrupt.

  • But the ones that survive will go up, will be upgraded,

  • and the surprises are likely to be on the upside.

  • So this is very important.

  • Again, this is about trying to hit winners and avoid losers.

  • And if you're buying bonds that most people don't think much

  • of, it's hard to have a big loser

  • because such low expectations are incorporated.

  • Now let me digress for a minute because this

  • is really important.

  • How do you make money as an investor?

  • The people who don't know think the way

  • you do it is by buying good assets, a good building,

  • stock in a good company, or something like that.

  • That is not the secret for success.

  • The secret for success in investing

  • is buying things for less than they're worth.

  • So if you buy a high quality asset-- and I say in the book,

  • there's a guy on the radio.

  • When I lived in LA, I listened to NPR on the way work.

  • And there was a guy and I heard him say it.

  • He said, well, if you go into a store and you like the product,

  • buy the stock.

  • He couldn't be more wrong because what

  • determines the success of an investor is not what he buys

  • but what he pays for it.

  • And if you buy a high quality asset but you overpay for it,

  • you're in big trouble.

  • You can buy a very low quality asset.

  • But if you pay less than it's worth,

  • chances are you're going to make money.

  • So the book says-- chapter three says-- the most important thing

  • is value.

  • Figuring out what the value of an asset is.

  • But chapter four says the most important thing

  • is the relationship between price and value.

  • So let's assume that you're able to figure out the value.

  • If you pay more than that, you're in trouble.

  • If you get it for less, the wind is at your back.

  • So it was very, very important then to be in an area

  • where the surprises were likely to be on the upside.

  • And if you buy the bonds of B rated companies which there are

  • such low expectations, maybe it's

  • easy for there to be a favorable surprise.

  • Now how can I prove to you that the expectations were low?

  • The answer is that if you look in the Moody's guide

  • to bonds in those years, what was the definition of a B rated

  • bond?

  • Quote, fails to possess the characteristics

  • of a desirable investment.

  • In other words, it's a bad investment.

  • Now, I drove here from the airport in my car.

  • And if I take you outside to look at my car

  • and I offer it to you for sale because I

  • don't need that car anymore.

  • When I'm done here, I'm not coming back.

  • If I say to you, would you like to buy

  • my car, what is the one question you must ask me

  • before saying yes or no?

  • Price.

  • You get an A. You get an A. So in other words,

  • it's a good buy at a certain price.

  • It's a bad buy at another price.

  • Moody is now saying that B rated bonds

  • are a bad by without any reference to price.

  • So in other words, there's no price

  • at which a company that has some credit risk

  • is worth investing in.

  • And by the way, before I turned to high yield bonds and '78,

  • I was part of the banks machinery

  • to buy the stocks of America's best companies.

  • And I explained to [INAUDIBLE] if you bought

  • the bonds of Hewlett Packard, Perkin Elmer, Texas

  • Instruments, Merk Lilly Xerox, IBM, Kodak, Polaroid, AIG, Coca

  • Cola, and Procter & Gamble, and if you bought them all in '68

  • and you held them until '73, you lost 90% of your money.

  • Why?

  • Because they were overpriced.

  • The average stock since the postwar

  • has traded at 16 times its next year's earnings.

  • These were trading at 80 and 90 times.

  • Why?

  • Because they were so good.

  • Everybody says these are great companies.

  • Nothing can go wrong.

  • So it doesn't matter what price you pay.

  • And if you pay 80 or 90 times, that's fine.

  • So here we are, in my experience--

  • again, experience as a teacher-- you

  • invest in the best companies in America,

  • you lose a lot of money.

  • Then you go to the high yield bond business,

  • you invest in the worst companies in America,

  • you make most money.

  • So it's an instructive lesson if you have your eyes open

  • and you learn from experience, which I did.

  • But the key words were and they survive.

  • Right?

  • This little trap there because you have

  • to catch those three words.

  • If you buy single-B bonds that don't survive,

  • then you're in big trouble.

  • But obviously, it's tautologically

  • true that if a company about which the expectations are low

  • survive, it'll probably, at minimum,

  • it'll pay off at maturity.

  • And maybe in the meantime it'll be upgraded or taken

  • over if they survive.

  • So what that convinced me when I was starting

  • the high-yield bond business and this conversation came

  • at a great point in time is that my analyst should

  • spend all their time trying to weed out

  • the ones that don't survive.

  • Not finding the ones that will have favorable events

  • but just excluding the ones that have unfavorably events.

  • And that's what we did.

  • Now I'll tell you an interesting story.

  • Around '05 or '06, the bible of investing is a book called

  • Security Analysis written by Graham and Dodd.

  • And they wrote the first edition 1934.

  • But Ben Graham was Warren Buffett's teacher

  • at Columbia and, in many ways, the father of value investing.

  • And he and David Dodd wrote this book in '34.

  • And they updated it in '40 and then several times after.

  • And the '40 edition is considered to be a great

  • edition.

  • So in '05 McGraw Hill, which owned the book,

  • said they want to update the book.

  • And they turned it over to Seth Klarman who's

  • a great debt investor in Boston at Baupost

  • and a professor-- I can't remember his name right now.

  • What?

  • AUDIENCE: [INAUDIBLE] Greenwald.

  • HOWARD MARKS: [INAUDIBLE].

  • That's right.

  • Bruce Greenwald at Columbia.

  • So you should be up here.

  • I'll sit down.

  • And they turned it over to Seth and Bruce

  • to bring out this revision.

  • And they, in turn, asked people to revise the sections.

  • And they asked me to revise a section on debt.

  • So that meant I had to go and read the 1940 edition in order

  • to update it.

  • And I came across something fascinating.

  • And it was and it verified what I had always thought.

  • It said that bond investing is a negative art.

  • What does that mean?

  • What it means is, I don't know how many of

  • you know how bonds work, but a bond is a promise to pay.

  • You give me $100, and I promise to give you

  • 5% interest every year, and then give your money back in

  • 20 years.

  • Fixed income it's called because all the events are fixed.

  • The contract is fixed.

  • The return is fixed, assuming the promise is kept.

  • So all 5% bonds that pay will pay 5%.

  • None will pay six.

  • None will pay four.

  • All the ones that pay will pay 5%.

  • What does that mean?

  • It means of the ones that pay, it

  • doesn't matter which ones you buy.

  • I'm going to like this one.

  • I like that one a lot.

  • That pays five.

  • And I like that one.

  • That pays five.

  • It doesn't make any difference.

  • You're not going to be a hero by choosing

  • among the bonds that pay.

  • The only thing that matters is to exclude

  • the ones that don't pay.

  • So if there are 100 bonds, 90 will pay.

  • They'll all pay the same thing.

  • It doesn't matter which of the 90 you choose.

  • The only thing that matters is excluding

  • the 10 that don't pay.

  • Negative art.

  • The greatness of your performance

  • comes not from what you buy but from what you exclude.

  • So I thought that was very useful.

  • I should have that up here, too.

  • But anyway, Milken was my fourth input.

  • So Taleb says that the future consists

  • of a range of possibilities with the outcome significantly

  • influenced by randomness.

  • And Galbraith says the forecasting is futile.

  • And Ellis says that if the game isn't controllable,

  • it's better to work to avoid losers than to try for winners.

  • And Milken says that holding survivors and avoiding defaults

  • is the key in bond investing.

  • So if you put them all together, that's

  • how you get the philosophy that's in the book.

  • These were my origins.

  • So when we started Oak Tree April 10 of 1995 almost

  • exactly 20 years ago, we wrote down our investment philosophy.

  • And here it is.

  • We published it.

  • We were a bunch of guys who had been working together

  • for most of the previous 10 years at a different employer.

  • And we left there as a group.

  • And we started Oak Tree.

  • So for a philosophy, I believe in writing things down.

  • And like learning at the [INAUDIBLE]

  • says today right them down, right.

  • So we wrote down our philosophy.

  • We published it.

  • We never changed a word since.

  • And the clients like knowing what our roadmap is.

  • So these were the six tenets of the investment philosophy.

  • So the first one says that the most important thing

  • is risk control.

  • And we tell the clients we think that for excellence

  • in investing, the most important thing is not

  • making a lot of money.

  • It's not beating the market.

  • It's not being in the top quartile.

  • The most important thing is controlling risk.

  • That's our job.

  • That's what we'll do for you.

  • And the clients come to us who want

  • to invest in our asset classes with the risks under control.

  • There are other people who put less emphasis

  • on controlling risk.

  • And they have better results in the good times

  • and worst results in the bad times.

  • Our clients want what we give them.

  • Number two, we have an emphasis on consistency.

  • So we say we don't try for the moon at the danger of crashing,

  • you know.

  • The first memo that I wrote in 1990--

  • I'm sure you remember that, [INAUDIBLE]--

  • talked about a guy who was head of an asset manager that had

  • a terrible year.

  • And he said, well, it's very simple.

  • If you want to be in the top five percent of money managers,

  • you have to be willing to be in the bottom.

  • I have no interest in being in the bottom 5%.

  • And I don't care about being in the top 5%.

  • I want to be above the middle on a consistent basis

  • over the long term.

  • And there's a funny bit of math.

  • This will confound the-- what did you call

  • yourself-- data scientists?

  • This will confound the data scientists in the room.

  • So in that first memo, I contrasted the comments

  • from that money manager with a comment from one of my clients

  • who told me right about the same time there

  • was the juxtaposition that caused

  • me to write that first memo.

  • He told me that for the previous 14 years,

  • his pension fund had never been above the 27th percentile

  • or below the 47th percentile.

  • So it was solidly in the second quartile

  • every year for 14 years.

  • So let's see.

  • 27.

  • 47.

  • The average of that is 37, right?

  • What percentile do you think that fund

  • was in for the whole 14 years?

  • AUDIENCE: [INAUDIBLE].

  • HOWARD MARKS: Four.

  • Four.

  • And if you think about it, it's really almost mysterious.

  • Why the fourth?

  • Not the 37th.

  • And the answer is that when people blow up,

  • they really blow up.

  • So we said we want consistency.

  • We want to be a little bit above the middle all the time.

  • Maybe we'll pop up to the top in the years

  • when the markets are terrible and our risk control

  • is rewarded.

  • But we think that over a long period of time

  • we'll be very respectable that way.

  • And our clients will have an absence

  • of bad experiences, which I think,

  • for them, is very important.

  • So then macro-forecasting is not critical to investing.

  • We do not make our decisions based on macro-forecasts,

  • as I explained to you.

  • We all have opinions.

  • We-- our official dictum is that it is OK to have an opinion.

  • You just shouldn't act as if it's right.

  • And I think this is very important.

  • You know, Mark Twain said, "it's not

  • what you don't know that gets you into trouble.

  • It's what you know for certain that just ain't true."

  • So we try to avoid holding strongly

  • to those macro opinions.

  • And finally, we don't do a lot of market timing, which

  • is very, very hard to do.

  • We do long term investing in assets that we think

  • are underpriced.

  • So that's the Oak Tree philosophy.

  • You could see how the origins and inspirations that I

  • went through fit into that.

  • And in fact, it's all distilled in our model, which says

  • that if we avoid the losers, the winners

  • take care of themselves.

  • And if we can make a large number of investors and just

  • weed out the problems, then we'll

  • have-- just think of the bell shaped curve.

  • We'll have a lot to do OK and an occasional one,

  • which is exceptional if we can weed these out.

  • So a lot of money managers go into the clients

  • and say we will get you in the top quartile

  • into the great right hand tail.

  • I think it's hard to do on a consistent basis.

  • And if you aim for the right hand tail and you miss,

  • you end up in the left hand tail.

  • What we say is we'll just lop off the left hand tail.

  • And if we can do that successfully,

  • and we pretty much have, then what will you have?

  • OK, good, very good, great, terrific, but no terrible,

  • the average will be very good.

  • And that's basically what we've had.

  • So lastly, I'll just leave you with what I consider my three

  • greatest adages.

  • Not mine but the ones I've encountered

  • over my career and that have been the most helpful.

  • And they're all used in the book.

  • First of all, what the wise man does in the beginning, the fool

  • does in the end.

  • In every trend in investing, it eventually becomes overdone.

  • If you find an asset which is cheap and buy it, that's great.

  • If everybody else figures it out that it's cheap,

  • then it will go up.

  • Then people see that it's rising.

  • And more people jump on the band wagon and it goes up, up, up.

  • And the last person to buy it is a fool.

  • And the first person to buy it is a wise man.

  • It's the same asset.

  • Just at different prices.

  • And as people say, first the innovator,

  • then the imitator, then the idiot.

  • So that's another way to look at this adage.

  • Number two, never forget the six foot tall man

  • who drowned crossing the stream that

  • was five feet deep on average.

  • Kind of like that skydiver who's right 98% of the time.

  • It's not sufficient, depending on how

  • you want to live your life, to survive on average.

  • We have to survive on the bad days.

  • So we have to be able to survive the low spots in the stream.

  • Your portfolio has to be set up to survive on the bad days

  • so you won't be shaken out of your investments.

  • And then finally, being too far ahead of your time

  • is indistinguishable from being wrong.

  • And yet, that's a great challenge

  • because, as I said before, the things

  • that are supposed to happen will not necessarily happen.

  • And they absolutely will not happen on time.

  • So you have to be able to live until the wisdom

  • of your decisions is proved, if at all.

  • So all of these things, I think, say

  • something about modesty and humility of belief

  • rather than cock sureness, which I think is the greatest risk.

  • So with that, [INAUDIBLE], I'll stop talking.

  • And we have a little time left.

  • And I'd love to take your questions.

  • That's what I'm here for.

  • MALE SPEAKER: Thank you, Howard.

  • This was fascinating.

  • So we are open for questions.

  • Please raise your hand, and I'll bring the mic to you.

  • AUDIENCE: The thing you said about what the wise man does

  • in the beginning the fool does in the end,

  • you can come up from a single stock.

  • You can think about your whole philosophy that way.

  • So you've been focusing here on avoiding losers.

  • And maybe humans are, kind of, generally focused on trying

  • to find winners.

  • Maybe that's what we'll always do wrong.

  • But if everybody in the world is trying to avoid losers,

  • maybe the wise investor now shoots for the winners,

  • do you know what I mean?

  • Sort of self-balancing.

  • HOWARD MARKS: Sure.

  • Well, number one, I don't think that we

  • have to worry about everybody becoming to prudent

  • or to wise because we're talking about human nature.

  • Charlie Munger-- the boys went to see

  • Charlie Munger this week.

  • One of the great quotes that Charlie

  • gave me was from the philosopher Demosthenes, who

  • said for that which a man wishes that he will believe.

  • What do most people want more anything else?

  • They want to get rich.

  • Very few people think that the secret to their happiness

  • comes from prudence and caution.

  • Most people think it comes from that stroke of genius, which

  • will put them on easy street.

  • But you're absolutely right.

  • And there are times when most people

  • behave in a prudent and cautious manner.

  • When is it?

  • It's in a crash when security prices are down here.

  • Right?

  • That's the time to turn aggressive and buy.

  • So Buffett says the less prudence

  • with which others conduct their affairs

  • the greater the prudence with which we

  • must conduct our own affairs.

  • And there are times when we should turn aggressive.

  • And that's when everything's being given away.

  • AUDIENCE: So you said hat you did not make any macro

  • forecasts, right?

  • But actually the macros can affect companies in other ways.

  • Like if you have an interest rate of, like, 30%.

  • I mean, 99% of the companies will

  • be gone or something like that.

  • So how do you even make an investment?

  • HOWARD MARKS: OK.

  • So now I know I'm not coming back to Google anymore

  • because the people are too intelligent because this

  • is one of the great traps.

  • I say that we don't invest on the basis of macro forecast.

  • But you have to have an economic framework in mind

  • when you predict the fortunes of individual companies.

  • And what I would say is what we try

  • to do is it's one thing to say that oil is at 50

  • and we're going to invest in this company

  • because it will do fine if oil's at 50,

  • survive if it goes to 30, and thrive if it goes to 70.

  • But it's another thing to say oil is 50,

  • I think it's going 110, I'm going

  • to invest in this company, which is going

  • to be great if it goes to 110 but bankrupt if it stays at 50.

  • So the question is, how radical are your forecasts?

  • And we try to anticipate a future that

  • looks pretty much like the norm and make allowance

  • for the thing that things other than the norm can happen.

  • And I can't really be much more concrete than that.

  • By the way, all this stuff is judgment.

  • You know, there are no rules.

  • There are no algorithms.

  • There are no formulas that always work.

  • None of this is any good unless the person making the decision

  • has superior judgment.

  • And the first chapter of the book

  • says the most important thing is second level thinking.

  • Most people think on the first level.

  • To be a superior investor, you must think on the second level.

  • You have to think different from everybody else.

  • But in being different, you have to be better.

  • So the first level thinker is naive.

  • He says, this is a great company, let's buy the stock.

  • The second level thinker says it's a great company,

  • but it's not as great as everybody thinks it is.

  • We better sell the stock.

  • That's the difference between being

  • an average person and a person with superior insight.

  • By the way, most people are not above average.

  • Yes, sir.

  • AUDIENCE: Do you think diversified index funds

  • adequately protect the amateur investor from losers?

  • HOWARD MARKS: Well this is a great question.

  • The role of the index fund.

  • A lot of people say, I'm going to take a low risk approach.

  • I'm going to invest in an index fund.

  • And they are confused.

  • What an index fund does is it guarantees you performance

  • in line with the index.

  • So the point is because of the operation of what's

  • called the efficient market, not many people

  • can beat the market.

  • It's true.

  • Most mutual funds do not beat the market.

  • Most mutual fund investors would be better off just

  • to be in an index fund.

  • And in fact, most active investment schemes

  • impose fees that they don't earn.

  • And that is one of the major reasons

  • that most active investment schemes perform below average.

  • So the index fund, which is called passive investing,

  • yes it reduce, eliminates, the likelihood

  • that you fail to keep up with the index.

  • It also, of course, eliminates the possibility

  • that you outperformed the index.

  • So you trade away the two sides of the probability distribution

  • for surety that you get index results.

  • But it doesn't eliminate the risk of the investment.

  • It eliminates the risk of deviating from the index.

  • What you have to keep in mind is that the index fund investor

  • loses money every time the index goes down.

  • Why?

  • Because there's no value added to keep it above.

  • And by the way, index investing is a fine thing

  • for the average amateur investor because

  • the average amateur investor, number one,

  • can't beat the market and, number two,

  • can't find anybody or hire anybody

  • who can beat the market.

  • But the only thing is he shouldn't think

  • that it's a risk-less trade.

  • You eliminate what we call benchmark risk.

  • But you retain the risk of the underlying asset.

  • AUDIENCE: So you've been through one or two

  • of these business cycles, I guess.

  • HOWARD MARKS: Yes.

  • AUDIENCE: And with availability of information

  • and with a number of books being written

  • about this subject about value, and proper investing,

  • and how many managers don't beat the market,

  • do you think the average investor is

  • doing anything different than they were 20 years ago?

  • HOWARD MARKS: Well, look, I think

  • there's a minor movement toward indexation.

  • It's not groundswell.

  • There's still lots of money in actively managed mutual funds

  • where there's 2% a year of fees and costs or one and a half.

  • But I think there's more in indexation every year.

  • And that's probably appropriate.

  • But I'll just turn i around.

  • I'll leave you with a question.

  • Why can't people beat the market?

  • Because the market's pretty efficient.

  • And market prices most things right.

  • And most people can't find and identify

  • and act on the times when the market prices things wrong.

  • That's why most people can't beat the market.

  • That's what I learned at University of Chicago.

  • And I think it's pretty true.

  • So the reason for the inability to beat the market

  • is the markets efficiency.

  • The markets efficiency comes from the concerted efforts

  • of thousands of investors who are

  • trying to find the bargains.

  • What happens when they stop trying?

  • So when the interest in active investment

  • declines because people give up on it

  • and turn to passive investing and all the analysts

  • quick studying the companies, then prices

  • resume their deviation from intrinsic value.

  • Then it becomes possible to beat the market again.

  • So it's really paradoxical and, I would say, counter-intuitive.

  • But I don't think we are close to that day.

  • But in theory, there comes a day when so little attention

  • is being paid to active investing

  • that active investing starts working again.

  • Yes, sir.

  • AUDIENCE: Thanks, Howard, for coming for the talk.

  • To talk about the difference in value and the price,

  • the other dimension is time.

  • So how do you estimate the time taking to [INAUDIBLE] to close?

  • HOWARD MARKS: You never do.

  • You never know.

  • See, what he's saying-- again, it's a very good question.

  • And what we want to do is we want

  • to find things where the intrinsic value is here

  • and the price is here.

  • So his question is, how do we estimate the time

  • that it's going to take for the gap to close?

  • And the answer is there's no way to say.

  • On occasion, there are what we call catalysts.

  • And one catalyst would be the pending maturity of a bond.

  • If a bond is going to mature in 2012

  • and it's selling at 60 because most people think

  • it's going to go bankrupt but we think

  • it's going to pay off at maturity,

  • then the existence of the maturity date

  • is going to force the convergence of price to value.

  • Another catalyst today is all these activist investors.

  • They find the company.

  • It's selling.

  • They think the interesting value is here.

  • It's selling here because the management is sub par

  • and they're not doing the right strategy.

  • So they go in.

  • They foment trouble.

  • They try to get a board seat.

  • They try to force the management to do the right thing

  • to course, to cause, the price to converge with the value.

  • So there are a few catalyst in the world.

  • But generally speaking, you buy a stock.

  • You hope-- you would think it's worth here.

  • The price is here.

  • You hope it'll convert.

  • But there's no way to estimate the time.

  • And that's the reason why being too far ahead of your time

  • is [INAUDIBLE] from being wrong because it

  • can take a long time.

  • AUDIENCE: Would you always look for presence of catalyst

  • when you find a gap?

  • HOWARD MARKS: There aren't enough.

  • I mean, it happens.

  • Most of what we do is in the fixed income world.

  • And there are more catalysts in the fixed income world

  • than in the equity world.

  • You find a stock.

  • How many stocks you think the activist investors

  • go after a year?

  • 10?

  • 20?

  • 50?

  • 100?

  • No more.

  • There are thousands of stocks.

  • So most stocks are never going to get catalyzed.

  • AUDIENCE: Curious if you could tell us

  • what it was like when you were out raising money

  • for Oak Tree in the early days.

  • I would imagine that today some clients are skeptical.

  • But I would imagine that it was--

  • was it a lot different for you back then?

  • HOWARD MARKS: Well by the time we started Oak Tree,

  • it wasn't that hard because we had a reputation.

  • But when I started raising money for our strategies--

  • 1978 junk bonds-- 90% of investment organizations

  • like Google had a rule, a concrete rule,

  • against any bond investing below A or below investment grade,

  • which is BBB.

  • And of course, Moody said it's an imprudent investment.

  • So that was very, very hard to overcome.

  • But what you have to do is you have to find a few people.

  • You see, you have to find a few people.

  • You have to go say to them you should do this

  • because nobody else is.

  • Because nobody else is doing it, it's languishing cheap.

  • You make no money doing the things

  • that everybody wants to do.

  • You make money by doing the things

  • that nobody wants to do who then turn out to have value.

  • And if you say that message to 100 investors in the beginning,

  • maybe 10 jump on board.

  • After it works for a while, then the rest

  • come on, like the screen says.

  • But hopefully, not too extreme.

  • But the point is it was very hard in the beginning.

  • And in certain foreign countries,

  • it was even harder because in certain foreign countries where

  • the thinking is a little more narrow than American thinking

  • I always thought that if I go into somebody's office

  • and I say you should do this because nobody else is

  • they'd call the man in the white coat to take me away.

  • They don't understand.

  • You know, I think that Americans semi intuitively

  • understand the value of contrarianism

  • and of being a maverick.

  • But in many countries, they just don't get it.

  • So that's an example, high yield.

  • But then we started Oak Tree in-- oh, no, no.

  • That was at Citi.

  • In '85, I switched from Citi to Trust Company of the West, TCW.

  • And in '88, we brought out the first distress debt fund.

  • Now we're not investing in companies

  • that have a risk of default.

  • We're investing in bonds that are either in default

  • or sure to be.

  • And people would say, well, how can you

  • possibly make money investing in the bonds

  • of bankrupt companies?

  • And we had to explain to them that if a creditor of a company

  • doesn't get paid the interest in principle as promised,

  • they have a claim against the value of the company.

  • And they exert that claim in a process called bankruptcy.

  • And in bankruptcy, to oversimplify

  • and over generalize, the old owners are wiped out.

  • And the old creditors become the new owners.

  • And if you bought an ownership stake through the debt

  • for--what-- for less than it's worth, then you make money.

  • And we've made about 23% a year for 28 years investing

  • in distressed debt before fees without any leverage.

  • So that's pretty astronomical.

  • Why?

  • Because from time to time in distress debt

  • you get to buy things for less than they're worth.

  • And in fact because other people are fleeing

  • from the bankruptcy, maybe you get

  • them to buy them for a lot less than they're worth.

  • So it's very challenging.

  • But you can't convince everybody.

  • But if you can explain the merits

  • and tell the story clearly, and concisely, and persuasively

  • then you get some clients.

  • And then, if you get good results,

  • then you get more clients.

  • AUDIENCE: Thank you, Howard, for your talk.

  • One question.

  • Buffet, in '99, said that if he was running very small amounts

  • of money he would be able to find lots of bargains

  • and beat the market by 50% and he

  • would use the word guaranteed.

  • I presume he meant that there are

  • a lot of inefficiencies in the small capitalization stocks.

  • One thing that kind of surprises me is if someone, an analyst,

  • willing to work hard on his own, not

  • in an institution, the word of distress debt investing

  • is kind of shut out, even for the value investor.

  • [INAUDIBLE] with a lot of technicalities and it

  • seems like the big institution has a lot of advantage there.

  • Are there such inefficiencies that are kind of shut out

  • to the institutions but the small investor willing to work

  • hard can find inefficiencies in the debt world?

  • HOWARD MARKS: Well I think that the small guy can even

  • be active in distressed debt.

  • He can't get enough bonds to get a seat at the creditors

  • committee table or have a voice.

  • But he can still find superior values.

  • You know, so what I was saying in answer to your question

  • is that if you get some accounts and you have good performance,

  • you'll get more accounts.

  • So that goes a little further because what I really

  • say is that if you have good performance,

  • you'll get more money.

  • And eventually, if you let that process become unchecked,

  • if you get more money, you'll have bad performance.

  • And this is one of the conundrums in our business.

  • So you have to halt that.

  • But the truth of the matter is that the little guy

  • has an advantage as long as he's willing to stay small.

  • Many people are not because in the short run, the more money

  • you manage when you get fees, it's a great lure

  • to take on more money.

  • But you have to stop it at a point

  • before it starts running your performance.

  • Now, for the data scientists among us,

  • I always like to point out that if I worked at Firestone Tires

  • and I developed a new tire, and I wanted

  • to know how far it would go, I would put it on a car

  • and run it until it blew up, right.

  • That's called destructive testing.

  • But as an investor with clients and a fiduciary responsibility,

  • I don't have the luxury of doing destructive testing.

  • So I can't add more.

  • People always say to me, well, what's

  • the limit on how much money you can invest well?

  • And I can't find out by running into the wall.

  • I have to stop this side of the wall.

  • One of the interesting lessons is

  • that if you stop this side of the wall

  • then you never find out where the wall really is.

  • But that's what we have to do.

  • So you have to stop.

  • And I believe that the person who

  • has a big brain, and a little money, and a lot of time,

  • and exceptional insight can find great bargains.

  • But that's a pretty daunting list.

  • And I don't think that Buffett's guarantee necessarily extents

  • to everybody in this room.

  • AUDIENCE: Do you see any unhealthy trends in valuation

  • in the market today the same way [INAUDIBLE]

  • was valued in the past?

  • HOWARD MARKS: Yes, I do because the menu extends.

  • What we call the capital market line

  • extends from what's called the risk free rate.

  • The risk free rate is the rate, generally speaking,

  • on the 30 day treasury bill.

  • And of course, if you can get 3% on the risk free rate,

  • then in order to tie up your money for five years in a five

  • year treasury you want four.

  • And to get it 10 years, you want five.

  • And if you can get 10 years on a government security of 5%,

  • then in order to go into a corporate security, which

  • has some credit risk, you would demand six.

  • And to go into a high yield bond, you demand 12

  • and so forth.

  • So there's a kind of a process called equilibration, which

  • makes things line up in terms of relative risk and return

  • but always pegged from the risk free rate.

  • Today, the risk free rate is zero.

  • So everything that I just named, this capital market line,

  • has had a parallel downward shift.

  • So before the crisis, [INAUDIBLE]

  • mentioned about the fact that I turned bearish.

  • All my money was in was in treasuries.

  • All the money that I had outside of Oak Tree was in treasuries.

  • And I was getting 6 1/2% for one, two, three, four, five,

  • six year maturities.

  • I was getting income and safety.

  • Today, you have a choice.

  • Income or safety because the things today that

  • are highly safe pay no income.

  • You know, and if you go to Fidelity--

  • conduct an experiment.

  • Go to Fidelity or Vanguard or a big mutual fund firm

  • and go online and look at their menu of offerings

  • and what is the current net yield after fees and expenses.

  • And you'll see that for money market and short term

  • treasuries, and maybe intermediate treasury,

  • the yield is zero.

  • So just think.

  • The guy is watching the Super Bowl in his undershirt.

  • He gets a statement from Fidelity.

  • He opens it up, and it says the yield on your fund is now zero.

  • He grabs the phone.

  • He calls the 800 number.

  • He says get me out of that fund that yields zero,

  • and put me in the one that yields six.

  • And he becomes a high yield bond investor.

  • He has no idea why.

  • He doesn't know what a high yield bond is.

  • He doesn't understand what the dangers are.

  • He doesn't understand how to pick a high yield bond manager.

  • But he's seduced by that 6% versus zero.

  • And all around the investment world

  • today, people are chasing return.

  • They don't like the low returns that are

  • available on safe instruments.

  • They're going for the gusto.

  • They're going for riskier instruments.

  • And they're doing it mindlessly.

  • And I promised you I'd mention some memos.

  • I forgot to do that.

  • But if you go back, I wrote one in March of '07 called The Race

  • To The Bottom.

  • And I talked about the fact that when

  • people are, number one, eager to invest and, number

  • two, not sufficiently risk conscious they do risky things.

  • And when people do risky things, the market

  • becomes a risky place.

  • And that's why Buffett says, the less prudence

  • with which others conduct their affairs,

  • the greater the prudence with which

  • we must conduct our own affairs.

  • And that is going on now to some extent

  • because people can't get a good return from safe instruments.

  • They're going into the risky ones, and they're bidding.

  • You know, so there's a race to the bottom.

  • It's like an auction.

  • Now if you want to buy a painting at Sotheby's, there's

  • an auction, and the painting goes to the person

  • who pays the highest price.

  • But in the investment world, it's a reverse auction.

  • Well sometimes you pay highest price,

  • but sometimes you bid in lowest return.

  • So there's a bond that's going to be issued by a company.

  • I say I demand 7% interest.

  • And this fellow says, no, I'll take six.

  • And that guy says, I'll take five.

  • I say I want protective covenants to make sure

  • that the company can't do things that ruins its own credit

  • worthiness.

  • He says I'll do it with less covenants.

  • And that guy says, I'll do it with no covenants.

  • What happens?

  • The bond is issued at 5% with no covenants.

  • And that's the race to the bottom.

  • And anybody who participates in that bond

  • probably could be making a mistake.

  • And that's going on now.

  • Not to the same terrible extent that it was in '06 and '07.

  • But you got to be careful today.

  • Oak Tree's model for the last 3 and 1/2 years

  • has been move forward but with caution.

  • Caution has to be a very important component

  • of everybody's actions today.

  • Well thank you very much for being with me.

  • And I hope you enjoyed it.

  • And when I think of more stuff, I'll come back.

  • MALE SPEAKER: Thank you so much.

  • [APPLAUSE]

MALE SPEAKER: Hello, everyone.

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