Subtitles section Play video Print subtitles Thank you very much. It's delightful to be here I can't really see any of you in the brightness of lights. I'll just focus on these guys, that will work for me. I haven't given a speech with slides in fifteen years. So one, these are really old slides. More relevantly we'll see how it goes. The name of my talk is "The rise of the different". Why the global order doesn't work and what we can do about it. The global order doesn't work. I think that's obvious. We live in what I call a G-0 world, not a G-7, not a G-20. you look around the world today, look at Europe it is very clear that while United States is prepared to send secretary Geithner over and over to dispense advice he is not writing any checks. And when french president Sarkozy went to China and said "How about some support?" the response from the Chinese was "Not no, but hell no'' if the Europeans are going to get through this crisis, as I believe they ultimately will, they will get through it themselves. Afghanistan, the United States is leaving Afghanistan. by 2014, the country will fall apart. When I spoke to some Chinese officials recently and I asked them "You know, the Brits have done Afghanistan, the Soviets, the Americans. Isn't it your turn?" The response was "No, we don't want to get involved". Look at Syria, it has been over eighteen months we have up to 30.000 dead and the likelihood of any resolution, from anyone, is really not in front of us. If Putin really wanted to make Obama's day, he could say "You know I've had a change of heart, we have real problems on the ground in Syria, I see the humanitarian devastation. I'll tell you what I'm going to do: I'm going to change my mind, I will support anything you want to do in the Security Council. So what would you like to do?" And then Obama would say "I wanted to blame you.'' (Laughter) But it's very clear we're not going to see a resolution of Syria either, and if you look at global institutions: the Doha round on trade is dead, climate, we have had now Copenhagen and Durban, Rio plus 20, how many more failed global summits on climate do we need to have before we understand we should stop having global summits on climate? I was at Columbia University I was with my students the other day and I asked them this question and one of my students raised his hand and said "Seven". Which I thought was a pretty good answer, I mean two or three is probably not enough but by the time you get to ten it gets a little silly, seven seems like enough failed additional global climate summits before we should probably stop. So, we are in this environment, it's very clear. And it's a very different world order from the one we had over the past decades, the old world order was led by the United States. When we came out of World War II we had Bretton Woods on currency, we had the World Bank, we had the I.M.F. we had the United Nations. They sound global, the World Bank sounds global. The World Series, sounds global, right? There is a Canadian team? It's not global, and this is the point, all of these institutions were created by the United States with American allies, American values, American priorities, American capital. And that was the order you can call it a G-7 or a G-20 but in reality was a G-1 plus. That order is gone. What replaces it? Why have we lost it? I think that there are three reasons I'm going to focus on one in particular today. The first is that the U.S doesn't want to do as much as they have historically. Had any of you seen the foreign policy debate of the U.S. presidential candidates a week ago? I apologize, you'll never get those ninety minutes back, they are just gone. But, of course, what they agreed on was that they didn't want to respond on foreign policy questions what they agreed on was that they wanted to do nation building at home. The average American is less interested in being a global policeman, they're less interested in being the lender of last resort, they are less interested in leading and directing globalization. Second major [reason] is that Europe and Japan, America's major allies, don't want to do this either, they are busy, they are distracted. It's very clear that for the last three years the Europeans have been maximally distracted by crisis, that is not going to change. Japan had now eighteen governments in twentytwo years. Modern day Asian record, it's about to be 19 in 23. They had the Fukushima crisis. The Japanese aren't going to do it. That is the reason number two. Reason number three, are all of these new countries. The rise of the rest or, more relevantely, the rise of the different. So, if you look back to 1980 and you look at where the world was in 1980, it is very clear and it's the old order that we all know. The United States is number 1, and going along the top ten economies you have all those G-7 countries. Look at Japan, Germany, France, U.K., Italy, Canada, and then, when you get to 8 to 10, you have countries that are really close. Mexico, taking advantage of the American economy just across the border, driven completely by the U.S. economy: trade, remittances, tourism, drugs it's all U.S. Spain, part of Europe, Argentina, the most europeanized of the Latin American countries. That is where we were in 1980. Where are we today? Top ten economies today. Look at the change. Look at how China is number 2, look at Brazil, Russia, look at India: we've got the BRICs. Where is Canada? Gone. Sorry Canada, Canada is off the list. So, it happens. You know, data driven Canada is gone. So, that is where we are today. But, I said, this is not just a rise of the rest, it is the rise of the different. The fact that they are different makes life harder. How are they different? Here is one way: they are poor. If you add the combined per-capita incomes of Brazil, Russia, India and China you are still lower than the per-capita income of the U.S.A. The Chinese would be the first to tell you, "Yes we are going to became the largest economy in the world, but when we do, we will still be a poor country". Their priorities will be different, they will be much more internally focused. Their levels of political stability are necessarily lower, the volatility that they are impacted by when shocks hit their countries are necessarily greater. The fact that all of these new countries around the table have fundamentally different qualities of life and fundamentally different priorities for the citizens, does not make them bad, it makes them different. And we have a harder time politically integrating and cooperating with different. It is one of the biggest challenges in the world today. What else? Let's look at capabilities - Foreign aid. Look how extraordinarily different. If you want to look at them from a planetary perspective, the USA is the Sun and the BRICs are Neptune, Pluto? I mean 214 billion dollars: Ok the U.S. is still the biggest game out there but Great Britain 26; the BRICs combined 3 billion dollars in foreign aid. Does that mean they are bad? No, it means they haven't done this before. So, here is a statistic for you. India has 1.1 billion people, New Zealand has 4 million. Their numbers of diplomats, foreign service officers, are the same. Now, we don't look to New Zealand for a lot of support on global trade, we don't look to them for a lot of support on climate, we don't look to them to really help move the needle on nuclear nonproliferation and yet we expect India to do this. Why? Because they are so big. But they are not. Their capabilities when you look at how long they have been global and how much time they have had to develop the institutions and the bureaucracies, it is not just that they don't want to agree on many of these issues it is not that they have different priorities and different systems but it is also that they don't have the capacity. How long has there been active international philanthropy in Britain, or in Canada, or across Europe or in United States? Does Russia have that yet? The answer is no. How long have we had multinational corporations that know how to work globally in the advanced industrial economies? The Indians aren't there yet, nor the Brazilians, nor the Chinese. They're getting there, it's incredibly impressive to look at how much they've grown but we have to understand how radically different in capacity and interest the other countries that matter around the world are today. Look at share of global military expenditure. The U.S. of course is number 1. What a lot of you may not know is that the U.S.A. spends more on defense than the world's ten next economies added up. Now, I'm not suggesting that's sustainable. I am not suggesting that it is right and proper for the United States to keep spending that amount on defence globally. I think a lot of Americans are having that discussion right now. But what is very clear is that if you want to really burden share and say "Well, the world order is changing so many other countries should be providing that level of security that the U.S. used to" you look at the numbers and you realize that it is not happening. It looks more like a G-0. Global competitiveness. Look at the ease of doing business in different countries U.S.A. is 4, U.K. is 7, look at the BRICs: 91 China and they are the best of the BRICs in terms of doing business ranking. How about the "Brain Drain"? U.K. is 4, U.S. is 5. Of course, you know, it was 4 and 5 in the other direction and TED started organizing in Oxford and now that just tipped it to the other direction. (Laughter) But even here: Brazil 27, Russia 111 the best universities in the world ovewhelmingly in the U.S.A. and in the advanced industrial economies. Yes, it is starting to change there are three Chinese institutions now in the top hundred. There were none, there are none from India. It is changing, it is changing slowly, we need to recognize where we are today. Ok. So, I think I have made the point that the new emerging markets that are sitting with us around the table and are critical to understanding how the world will or will not be led, are fundamentally different from the advanced industrial democracies. At least can we say that the emerging markets themselves have a lot in common? That they will become more coherent as a group? The answer is no. Let's compare the BRICs. Let's look first of all at systems of government. The Brazilians and the Indians are democracies, the Russians and the Chinese not so much. How about energy? The Russians and the Brazilians are energy exporters, the Indians and the Chinese not so much. How about the economy? Well, Brazil, India and China have fairly diversified economies you see that in terms of what they manufacture, the consumers sectors, levels of import. Russia is a petrostate, not so much diversity. Demographics. China, Russia and Brazil: urbanized, strongly urbanizing. India: 31% of the population is in cities. That is compared to up 50% in Africa. Not so much. Finally, neighborood. India, China, Russia: all being buffeted by difficult - and getting worse - geopolitical conflicts. Brazil is in a geopolitical neighborood where they don't have to deal with this stuff - they have got Chavez in Venezuela, who is near death. That's about it. I say this because fundamentally if you look at the kinds of things that might create shared interest you look at how the world order went from Great Britain to the United States and how similar those countries are. How similar our countries are in terms of all of these kinds of points.