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  • HAASS: Well, good morning. I'm Richard Haass, and I want to welcome all of you here, as

  • well as those watching on screens of various sorts, to this meeting of the Council on Foreign

  • Relations. At its core, the Council on Foreign Relations is an independent, nonpartisan organization.

  • We're a think-tank, and we're a publisher dedicated to helping its members and others

  • better understand the world and the foreign policy choices facing the United States.

  • And it's difficult to imagine a person better to do just that, to help us understand the

  • foreign policy choices facing the United States and the world, than the 67th secretary of

  • state, Hillary Rodham Clinton.

  • CLINTON: Thank you, Richard.

  • (APPLAUSE)

  • HAASS: The timing of today's meeting could hardly be better, given all that's going on

  • in the world. Turbulence in the Middle East continues to mount. Iraq's central government

  • is steadily losing control of territory, including Mosul, its second-most-important city. Syria's

  • civil war, now in its fourth year, shows no signs of abating. Egypt's new president faces

  • a divided public and a struggling economy. The Israeli-Palestinian talks have hit a wall.

  • And it's far from certain that negotiations with Iran will produce agreement on a nuclear

  • program that is enough for that country and not too much for others.

  • Elsewhere, the peace that we've all grown accustomed to in Europe has been shaken by

  • the heavy-handed Russian interference in Ukraine. Asia, for three decades characterized by economic

  • dynamism and political stability, now is defined more by economic slowdown and political tension.

  • There's a new government in India with broad popular support, but next door, there's a

  • weak government in Pakistan with a growing nuclear arsenal and a growing terrorist threat.

  • Another Afghan government will soon emerge, but how it will fare is anyone's guess.

  • Meanwhile, here at home in the United States, recent polls show a large number of Americans

  • have little interest in this world and an even larger number who think this country's

  • ability to lead the world is in decline. I would imagine at times like this, our speaker

  • is pleased to be the former secretary of state.

  • (LAUGHTER)

  • This is Secretary Clinton's ninth visit to the Council on Foreign Relations, and we're

  • honored to have her. And I expect I speak for everyone in this room inand watching and

  • thanking her for her decades of public service as first lady, as senator here from the great

  • state of New York, and as secretary of state.

  • (APPLAUSE)

  • Now, unless you've been in the witness protection program, you will know that she has just published

  • a memoir of her time at Foggy Bottom, "Hard Choices." It comes in at 656 pages. For the

  • record, this is longer than the memoirs of James Byrnes, Warren Christopher, Alexander

  • Haig, and Madeleine Albright, but it is shorter -- in some cases, much shorter -- than those

  • of Dean Acheson, George Schulz, Condoleezza Rice, James Baker, Henry Kissinger, and Cordell

  • Hull.

  • (LAUGHTER)

  • It is also to the page the same length as Colin Powell's. Make of all this what you

  • will.

  • (LAUGHTER)

  • This meeting today is part of the Council's History Maker Series that focus on the contributions

  • made by prominent individuals at a critical juncture in U.S. foreign policy, and I would

  • like to thank HBO and Richard Plepler for making this possible.

  • The way we're going to do it is the secretary and I will speak for a time, and then I will

  • turn it open to CFR members for their questions.

  • Madam Secretary, welcome.

  • CLINTON: Thank you.

  • HAASS: Your first visit as secretary of state was to Asia. And for many observers -- and

  • I'll count myself among them -- the biggest foreign policy idea of your tenure as secretary

  • of state was what some call the pivot, others call the rebalance to Asia.

  • So to begin, do you actually agree that -- do you see your own legacy that way? And why

  • and how did you choose Asia for such a focus?

  • CLINTON: Well, Richard, first thank you, and I'm delighted to be back here at the Council

  • and have an opportunity to talk with you and then with the audience about these issues.

  • I do see it as one of the most significant strategic moves that we made during those

  • first four years. And if you just step back from the immediacy of all of the crises that

  • you were listing, you do have to keep your eye on the trend lines, not just the headlines.

  • And there is certainly no doubt that much of the history of the 21st century is going

  • to be shaped in Asia, and the United States has always been a Pacific power, but when

  • I became secretary, there was a widespread feeling among our friends and our competitors

  • in Asia that the United States had basically vacated the field and there was a great pent-up

  • desire that we begin once again to demonstrate our concern for and involvement in the Asia

  • Pacific. And that's why I decided to go first to Asia.

  • And also to do what is one of the most important jobs of American foreign policy right now,

  • and that is to defend and renew the rules-based order. That's true globally, but it was especially

  • true in Asia, to demonstrate that there had to be a consensus about the way forward economically

  • and politically. It's why I went to Indonesia and signed something called the Treaty of

  • Amity and Cooperation, hardly a headline-grabber back here at home, but it committed the United

  • States to be an active participant in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and

  • eventually become a member of the East Asia Summit, because our goal was to support and

  • embed the United States in the multilateral architecture of Asia.

  • It was also important to reassure our friends and our treaty allies, such as Japan, that

  • the United States was still committed to their security, as well as to economic prosperity.

  • And I also brought with me the idea that we would try to have a broader dialogue with

  • China. Most of our dialogue up until that point, as you know, had to be about economics.

  • And the Treasury Department led that. Secretary Paulson had done a heroic job, you know, really

  • working and involving China in conversations about currency, trade and the like.

  • But there were a lot of strategic questions that needed to be addressed. So Tim Geithner

  • and I formed the Strategic and Economic Dialogue. And I think there's a tendency too often in

  • our country, in our Congress and in the public, the press, that these kinds of steps to build

  • strong foundations are not the real stuff of important diplomacy. They're not the headlines

  • that people are seeking. But I believe that we have to rebuild this rules-based order.

  • We have to come up with an architecture that can persuade countries that it is in their

  • interests then to be a part of it.

  • So we had all of this at work when I went in February 2009 and then followed through

  • over the next four years.

  • HAASS: An important part of the pivot and the rebalance was the -- was an economic dimension,

  • and was obviously trade, the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Is it your sense that, given

  • where this country is, in part also given where your own party is, the Democratic Party,

  • that it's possible right now for the United States to give the president the authority

  • he needs to complete the negotiations of such an agreement?

  • CLINTON: Well, he can complete the negotiations. That is ongoing. And in fact, I have been

  • briefed that there is progress being made on the so-called TPP negotiations. The challenge

  • -- and really, what your question was about -- is whether there will be what's called

  • fast-track authority granted to the president...

  • HAASS: Trade promotion authority.

  • CLINTON: Trade promotion authority. Right now, I think that's not likely, but that doesn't

  • mean that the treaty can't be presented and considered on its merits, and particularly

  • if it can be used to convince the American electorate, as well as the Congress, that

  • we have to address these internal at the border barriers to our products, we have to begin

  • to take on state capitalism, because it's one of our biggest competitive threats, we

  • have to be able to raise standards on goods that are going to end up in our markets one

  • way or the other, it may be possible -- and I certainly hope it will be -- to make that

  • case. But, of course, it depends upon what's in it. And we don't yet have the final document.

  • HAASS: One of the crises you had to manage with China was over -- with the human rights

  • activist Chen Guangcheng. And in the end, it all worked, and he was able to come here.

  • He actually spoke here at the Council on Foreign Relations. What did this experience teach

  • you about dealing with the Chinese and about how you see the right balance between promoting

  • political change in China, yet at the same time having a relationship that deals with

  • strategic issues?

  • CLINTON: Yeah. Well, you know, this book is named "Hard Choices" for a purpose, because

  • that is exactly the experience that I had. You're constantly trying to promote your values.

  • We think they're American values, but in my view, they're universal values and we need

  • to stand up for them. You're trying to pursue your interests -- strategic, economic, political

  • -- and you're also trying to protect the security of our country, our friends, and our allies.

  • And oftentimes, those are in conflict or at least appear to be.

  • This is a case, however, where I think the work we had done for the previous two-plus

  • years to create this more comprehensive relationship and to spend a lot of time building the personal

  • relationships that go into that with the Chinese leaders paid off, so that when I got that

  • phone call at my home telling me that this flyingblind dissident, this human rights activist,

  • had escaped from house arrest and he was seeking to be driven to Beijing and find refuge in

  • the American embassy, because there was nowhere else that he felt safe, that was the kind

  • of tribute to American values that you don't just turn your back on, or at least I don't.

  • And I said, "Go get him," and we did get him, a little, you know, James Bond-ish kind of

  • activity going on there. And we brought him into the embassy, where he was treated by

  • our medical team. And we then began working with him to try to figure out what he wanted

  • and how we could help facilitate it.

  • The negotiations with the Chinese, as I recount in this chapter, were contentious. They were

  • not happy, to put it mildly. I was on my way to China just a few days after I gave the

  • order to go out and get him. But we had a very candid, open, ongoing discussion. There

  • were a lot of false starts and detours, but we ended up in a good place. We didn't sacrifice

  • the relationship, and we stood up for our values at the same time.

  • So that's why this very slow, hard, boring -- to paraphrase Weber -- in the diplomatic

  • sphere, as in politics, is so important. And we can't get impatient. Building these relationships,

  • continuing to stand up for our values, pursue our interests, protect our security is a long-term

  • investment, and it takes the kind of strategic patience that, you know, we're just going

  • to have to demonstrate more effectively in the years to come.

  • HAASS: You mentioned the phrase in your answer there about personal relationships. You dealt

  • with some fairly strong personalities. Mr. Lavrov, the...

  • CLINTON: Well, I like to think that the same is true.

  • (LAUGHTER)

  • HAASS: ... touche -- Foreign Minister Yang of China, the prime minister of Israel. And

  • to what extent did you come away actually thinking that the personal relationship mattered?

  • Or at the end of the day, whether they liked you or you liked them, it didn't really matter

  • that it was just good, old-fashioned statecraft?

  • CLINTON: I do think the personal relationships matter, which is why I stressed building them,

  • expanding them, trying to understand the point of view of the other party. But at the end

  • of the day, leaders are going to do what they think is in the best interests of their states.

  • Part of building that relationship, though, is perhaps to open the window a little wider

  • about how to define those interests. Again, just to build on the Chen China example, both

  • the Chinese and we valued the relationships we had been building. They were not one-offs.

  • I mean, I did a lot of, you know, personal time and hospitality to demonstrate respect

  • and appreciation for the Chinese leaders. They reciprocated. So that when we kept running

  • into obstacles to resolve that particular crisis, we could fall back on those relationships.

  • And I think the same is true going country by country. There are obvious exceptions,

  • very difficult to build relationships with some people, and I'm talking about you, Vladimir.

  • ... you know, it doesn't mean you don't keep trying. You do have to keep trying, because

  • you've got to find what those -- what those marginal differences can be that really could

  • make a significant change in how an issue is perceived.

  • And what's -- what was surprising to me, because I also spent a lot of time advancing technology

  • as a tool of diplomacy and the like, but we could talk to anybody anywhere long distance.

  • You can have a video conference. You could Skype. You could pick up the phone. It was

  • more important than ever that the United States showed up, and that we sat there, and we listened,

  • and we talked, and we ate and ate and ate.

  • (LAUGHTER)

  • And we did what is not necessarily building a friendship, but building more understanding

  • and from that perhaps establishing more strategic trust, which is really the coin of the diplomatic

  • realm, based on my experience.

  • HAASS: It's the Woody Allen approach to diplomacy, 80 percent is showing up.

  • CLINTON: Absolutely.

  • HAASS: Let's switch to the Middle East. The so-called Arab Spring broke out on your watch.

  • What's your take on it after three-and-a-half years? And what do you say to those who say,

  • look, we inherited a flawed order in the Middle East, and what we've helped bring about is

  • an even more flawed disorder?

  • CLINTON: Hmm. Well, I think there is some truth to that, but it's not the whole picture

  • by any means. And it probably -- you know, this is always an escape hatch for anybody

  • asked a question like this -- it's probably too soon to tell, but I can certainly share

  • my observations and experiences.

  • If you compare the different places where this occurred, there are different reasons

  • why maybe not as much progress has happened as we would have liked, but there are some

  • commonalities.

  • Take Tunisia, Libya, Egypt. Very different settings for the Arab Spring. Tunisia, which

  • had a middle class, basically, lots of poverty, lots of wealth, but they had a solid middle

  • class, they havehad laws which enshrined equality for women in Tunisia. They had an Islamist

  • movement, but it was not extreme. It was much more based in an intellectual, if you will,

  • approach to using Islam as an organizing principle for a new state post-Ben Ali.

  • And they've had a rocky, but -- I would argue -- successful transition. Now, they still

  • have to make it sustainable. They've got a constitution which has been agreed to by all

  • the different parties. They've changed governments a few times, and it's been peaceful. So a

  • lot of observers are looking at Tunisia to see how they manage moving forward.

  • Compare that, of course, with Libya, where the 42-year rule of Gadhafi hollowed the country,

  • hollowed out the institutions, drove into exile people who could have contributed post-revolution.

  • When Gadhafi fell and the revolution was successful, there were some very promising early signs.

  • That first election was well done, carried out according to international standards,

  • and the winners were largely moderate secularists.

  • And then what happened is when you can't perform the most basic function of a state -- in other

  • words, provide security -- you're going to have all those tribes who had allied themselves

  • predominantly with the rebels trying to figure out, what's in it for them? And I've met some

  • of them, and, you know, they were united by their hatred of Gadhafi, but little else.

  • And so now there's an effort to try to assert state security over this range of militias

  • and tribal organizations.

  • So the jury is out. We don't know. It's a rich country. It has the resources, if it

  • can get itself organized. It's supposed to have an election towards the end of this month.

  • We'll watch.

  • Compare that to Egypt. You know, the revolution in Egypt was leaderless. It truly was run

  • by young people. They were motivated and organized through social media. But they were not political.

  • And when I went to Egypt, shortly after the fall of Mubarak, I met with several dozen

  • leaders, so-called leaders of the Tahrir Square revolution, and I asked them, I said, "Well,

  • so who's going to run for office, if there are elections?" "Well, we don't do that."

  • "Well, who's going to organize a political party?" "That's not our job. Our job was to

  • protest, demonstrate, and bring down the dictator."

  • I said, "Well, you realize there are only two organized forces in Egypt, the military

  • and the Muslim Brotherhood." "Oh, no. Others will rise up. There will be an election that

  • will validate the revolution." I was pessimistic and, I think, realistic. We had quite an exchange,

  • some have called it a shouting match, because I was just appalled that there was no political

  • element to this revolution.

  • Fast-forward, we went through the Muslim Brotherhood, we went through the uprising orchestrated

  • by the military to remove the Muslim Brotherhood, and now the military is back. And Egypt faces

  • an enormous amount of internal opposition and, I think, extremism, so we'll watch. We'll

  • see how that unfolds.

  • HAASS: But given what you just said, did we not -- maybe should we have been a bit slower

  • in our haste to push out Mr. Mubarak? You mentioned in the book your concerns about

  • that and your support for some of what Frank Wisner was trying to do. Or in the case of

  • Libya, if we were going to participate in the ousting of Gadhafi, ought not we have

  • been prepared to have done more in the follow-up, almost Colin Powell's rule about Pottery Barn?

  • We helped break it, but we didn't really help put it back together.

  • CLINTON: Well, on Libya first, that's not accurate. We did try. We tried very hard to

  • help them secure their borders, to help them follow our advice, along with our European

  • and some of our Arab colleagues in the action against Gadhafi, to begin to assert security.

  • That -- that is a perfect case where people who've never had that opportunity to run anything,

  • manage anything, even participate in meaningful politics understandably are not even sure

  • what questions to ask, let alone what answers to take. There was reluctance to accept too

  • much Western help, and we did accomplish a couple of very good objectives. We removed

  • some of the stockpiles of WMD. We got some -- we got some important work done, but not

  • near enough, and we're still at it. We're still trying to work with whoever is going

  • to be in the government.

  • On Egypt, you're right, I detail in the book -- I had a lot of apprehension about just

  • throwing Mubarak out of office not knowing what was going to come next or not helping

  • to prepare a more orderly transition. And I was the one who suggested -- I, along with

  • Bill Burns -- that we send Frank Wisner, who knew Mubarak well. I also called the sultan

  • of Oman, who knew him well. I was trying to urge other voices to tell Mubarak to move

  • more quickly to demonstrate, number one, he would not run again, number two, his son would

  • not run again, number three, there would be a process of inclusive consultation that could

  • lead to reform. We couldn't persuade him to do that.

  • And at a certain point, you know, the president and other leaders spoke out and said he had

  • to go, but I remained apprehensive about what would follow.

  • HAASS: You describe in the book Syria. I think the phrase you use is a wicked problem. And

  • I don't think anybody in this room would disagree. And you're extremely open about saying that

  • you argued in favor -- I think it was 2012 -- that we ought to provide arms to selected

  • opposition, and you lost the argument.

  • CLINTON: I did.

  • HAASS: And you went on to say that the president was influenced by the Iraq experience and

  • his concern about -- that the United States should not get overly entangled in Syria.

  • Do you think in retrospect that people have overlearned the lessons of Iraq?

  • CLINTON: Well, I think that it's often the case that we overlearn lessons and underlearn

  • some lessons, if that's a word. I think that Iraq was one of the three reasons we were

  • in such a big hole when the president became president, and certainly that's what I experienced

  • as secretary of state from day one.

  • Iraq had soured so much of the world, particularly our friends, against the United States. The

  • abuses that were disclosed arising out of the war on terror further soured the feelings.

  • And then, of course, the economic collapse was an extraordinary blow to America's prestige

  • and our projection of leadership.

  • So I think it's understandable that not just the president, but many people were trying

  • to quickly learn and apply the lessons. I mean, one of the lessons that the president

  • took, which is certainly supportivesupported by the American people, is that our foreign

  • policy cannot be defined principally by military means and by our defense budget. It's why

  • I started talking about smart power. That was a meme that I was trying to inject and

  • send the message overseas that we were going to focus on diplomacy and development. We

  • would always focus on defense, but not to the extent that it had been relied upon and

  • had been perceived as being the only tool in our toolbox.

  • So, yes, I think you can overlearn and underlearn. I mean, too strong an America, too weak an

  • America, how do you get to where the right balance is? Because, obviously, as you have

  • written, Richard, if we're not strong at home, if our economy is not producing at home, if

  • the American people are not united at home, we can't project leadership abroad. So you

  • have to learn the right lessons and apply them.

  • With respect to Syria, yeah, I did feel quite strongly that we needed to see if it were

  • possible to vet and train and equip moderate opposition figures, because when this started,

  • there was truly a citizens' uprising. And you had people taking arms who were pharmacists

  • or professors or students, and they had no training, they were up against a very disciplined,

  • large army that Assad -- give him credit for this -- kept control over, very few defections,

  • a quite lethal fighting force.

  • Where we are now is obvious to everyone. We didn't do that. I'm not saying if we had it

  • would have prevented the outcome we're seeing now. But in addition to the formation of a

  • well-armed, incredibly tough fighting force by ISIS, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria,

  • and other jihadist groups, you have at least 1,000 foreign fighters, primarily from Europe,

  • but also at least some from the United States, who are getting combat, battlefield experience

  • and becoming even more extreme.

  • So this is not just a Syrian problem anymore. I never thought it was just a Syrian problem.

  • I thought it was a regional problem. I could not have predicted, however, the extent to

  • which ISIS could be effective in seizing cities in Iraq and trying to erase boundaries to

  • create an Islamic state.

  • That's why it's a wicked problem. If -- you know, Dave Petraeus and I came forward with

  • a proposal, because it was supposed to be -- or we thought it should better be run by

  • the CIA than by the military, to avoid the whole boots-on-the-ground and raise a lot

  • of the concerns -- and we had been effective doing things like that in other places over

  • the last 40, 50 years. We did a very good job supporting Colombia in their fight against

  • the drug cartels and the FARC insurgency. But it was a much different environment. And

  • it was -- it was so unclear exactly who was going to be there and whether or not they

  • would be influenced by extremists. So now the wicked problem has gotten even wickeder.

  • HAASS: Speaking of another wicked problem, you also suggest in the book your discomfort

  • with the president's decision to couple the Afghan surge with a timeline then for drawing

  • down. And now, in a sense, he's done something similar. He's linked keeping a residual force

  • in Afghanistan until the end of 2016 to that deadline.

  • And given what's going on in Iraq, the unraveling of Iraq, where there is no residual American

  • force, are you comfortable or uncomfortable with a calendar rather than a conditions-based

  • approach to what we're now going to do in Afghanistan?

  • CLINTON: Well, first, let me say on Iraq, because it's in the news and it's a dreadful

  • deteriorating situation, the deadline on Iraq was set -- was set by the prior administration,

  • that if there were not a status-of-forces agreement, which is the agreement under which

  • American military forces can be positioned in a country to provide services that are

  • agreed to or asked for by the host country, there was not a SOFA, there would not be American

  • troops.

  • And when President Obama came in, he was obviously not an enthusiast about the Iraq war from

  • the very beginning, very strong critic of it, both its initiation and its handling,

  • there was a lot of effort to work through with the Maliki government what such a status-of-forces

  • agreement would look like. At the end of the day, the Maliki government would not agree.

  • So the decision was made, in effect. There could not be American troops left without

  • such an agreement.

  • We have a different situation in Afghanistan. I was even negotiating at the end of my tenure

  • with Karzai over the bilateral security agreement, which would embody a SOFA, and then much to

  • everyone's surprise, including mine, he said he wouldn't sign it. Both the two remaining

  • presidential candidates, Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah, have said they will sign

  • it, so there will be legal support for America staying in Afghanistan.

  • And although there has been a trajectory set for withdrawing combat troops, moving toward

  • a training, support mission, I believe that if one of those two men elected as president

  • of Afghanistan were to come with a well-thought-through plan about what was needed -- because it's

  • not only the United States which has agreed to continue to support, it's also NATO, which

  • has agreed to an enduring presence -- I believe that would be very seriously considered.

  • So it's a different situation. Now, I do think that a lot of the leadership in Afghanistan

  • are watching what's happening in Iraq. But on the side of setting a timeline, which is

  • important, I think that the signal that was sent to various audiences, to the American

  • public, to our allies and their publics, and to the Afghans was very clear. We're willing

  • to help you. We're willing to continue making the sacrifices necessary, but you have to

  • step up to it.

  • And the Afghan security forces have been, you know, well trained and they're getting

  • better all the time, and we think that they, you know, do have the right stuff to be able

  • to defend, but that's what we're going to find out in the next couple of years.

  • HAASS: So just to be -- just want to make sure we understand -- so -- but if the new

  • president, whether it's Abdullah Abdullah or Ashraf Ghani, were to ask the United States

  • to extend and you -- on a plan, you'd be open to considering that, to supporting that?

  • CLINTON: I would. You know, it depends upon conditions on the ground and what was being

  • asked for.

  • HAASS: Yeah, I'm just going to ask a few more, and then we'll open it up. One thing I read

  • in the book was that you suggested to the president that he take another look at the

  • Cuba embargo...

  • CLINTON: Yes.

  • HAASS: ... that you didn't think this was serving American interests.

  • CLINTON: Right. Right, and I don't. And I write in the book about, you know, the conclusion

  • that I certainly have reached, that the embargo is Castro's best friend. It provides Castro

  • an excuse for everything. Why do we still have to be harassing, you know, the mothers

  • of the imprisoned? Well, because America's behind it. Why do we have to, you know, prevent

  • the kind of relationships that we would like to see Cuba engage in in opening up and being

  • more forward looking? Well, because we can't -- you know, America is embargoing us.

  • It would also help our relationships throughout Latin America, because it's also used as an

  • excuse there. Every conversation at every Summit of the Americas starts with a conversation

  • about Cuba. I would like to see that excuse removed.

  • And I do believe, however, that shifting the onus onto the Castros will not end the embargo

  • until after they're gone. I mean, I honestly believe that. Every time we've tried -- my

  • husband tried, and, remember, there were talks going on. There was behind-the-scenes. We

  • were looking at everything from immigration to, you know, lessening up on state sponsor

  • of terrorism, all the rest of it, the Brothers to the Rescue plane shot down, ensuring there

  • would be a reaction in the Congress that would make it very difficult for any president to

  • lift the embargo alone.

  • Fast-forward -- I'm not telling tales out of school -- the Obama administration having

  • the same conversations with Cuban counterparts and with leaders of countries in the region

  • so that the Cubans could hear an echo. What do they do? They arrest Alan Gross, a development

  • professional, throw him in jail, refuse under any negotiations to let him loose unless we

  • return five convicted Cuban spies, who are slowly being let out of prison because their

  • time is up, not because of a trade.

  • So I think we should -- we should advocate for the end of the embargo. We should advocate

  • for normalizing relations and see what they do. See how they respond. And then go back

  • to a lot of our friends in the region and say, "The United States is ready to move.

  • What about your buddies in Havana? What are they going to do now?"

  • And so I would like to change the psychology of this issue. We've been in a corner for

  • too long. We need to get out of the corner. As I say in the book, probably the most important

  • long-term commitment this country can make is to a much closer, more constructive relationship

  • within our own hemisphere. And if we do that, we will be much better positioned to deal

  • with all else that goes on in the world. It will be difficult to get it to the point I

  • would like to see it unless we clear away the accusations against the United States

  • over the embargo.

  • HAASS: How big of a problem was the WikiLeaks outbreak? Did foreigners literally stop confiding

  • in you and your colleagues in meetings? And did people stop putting things down on paper?

  • CLINTON: Yes. What happened was leaders said they would meet only with me, no note-takers,

  • and would clear the room. You know, that's a little challenging.

  • (LAUGHTER)

  • I got a good memory, but not that good a memory. And so it was -- it was complicated. But there

  • were other consequences.

  • A lot of the WikiLeaks cables, to just quickly explain, in the Bush administration, the military

  • wanted more real-time analysis about various countries, and the decision was made to share

  • a lot of State Department cables, and it went into the military system. As you know, a low-level

  • intelligence officer decided to turn over hundreds of thousands of those to the WikiLeaks.

  • One thing that happened is there were names of people who were vulnerable, both because

  • they were in governments who were providing information to American diplomats, because

  • they disagreed with their governments, or they were human rights activists or dissidents

  • who were contacting and working with our embassy to promote greater openness and to, you know,

  • ask for help that we would try to give to get people out of jail, get them out of the

  • country.

  • There were also some very specific instances. The former ambassador to Libya, when WikiLeaks

  • came out with all of what he'd been writing about Gadhafi, was under personal threat.

  • There were a couple of thugs who, you know, pushed him around a little. I had to withdraw

  • him. And we saw -- we saw the role that confidential cabling can play in providing good information,

  • and we also found out that a lot of our diplomats were really good writers, very colorful writers.

  • (LAUGHTER)

  • They were doing their jobs very well, I have to add. So we had to hustle hard to get it

  • back in the box as much as we could to protect people, to move people where necessary. And

  • then I went on an apology tour, starting with multiplesmultitudes of phone calls and some

  • personal meetings with leaders who were particularly aggrieved by what had been reported.

  • HAASS: You're one of the 20 or so people in American history who has served both in the

  • United States Senate and as secretary of state, so, therefore, you've now been on both sides

  • of the table.

  • CLINTON: Yes.

  • HAASS: You've given the testimony, and you've heard it. I want to ask what you prefer; I

  • have a hunch. What do you, though, see as the proper division of labor between the executive

  • branch when it comes to foreign policy and the legislative?

  • CLINTON: Ah, an age-old difficult question, but one that I struggled with. I was on the

  • other side of the table for eight years in the Senate and served on the Armed Services

  • Committee, so had lots of interaction with the defense side of our executive branch,

  • and then as secretary of state, I took it as a personal obligation to be as responsive

  • to Congress as I possibly could be.

  • What's missing in this debate is very fundamentally the understanding of what the roles are and

  • should be. Every president wants more authority than every Congress wants to give him, but

  • every president has to accept more responsibility than any Congress is willing to accept.

  • (LAUGHTER)

  • So it's a constant dance, you know, where you -- you know -- and having been there,

  • I know -- where people in Congress are saying, "Just do it, and then I will blast you, but

  • get it done," where the meetings in the executive branch are, "You know, look, we've informed

  • them, but they act like we never told them. So what's the point of informing them?"

  • We almost need a new code of conduct about how to conduct foreign policy between the

  • two branches. And now, of course, we've got the courts, at least the FISA courts, intervening

  • from time to time.

  • But, seriously, for me, the biggest problem was the erosion of consensus about the conduct

  • of foreign policy and how much to trust each other. And that's going to take time to repair.

  • Some of it started with the Iraq war decision. You know, as I write in the book, I gave my

  • vote to the authorization and was regretful about the way it was used and then even more

  • so about how that war unfolded. And it turned out to be a mistake. And I say that plain

  • and simple. So there is a lot of residue of that.

  • Then the Obama administration comes in, and President Obama is very clear -- end that

  • war in Iraq, get those prisoners out of Guantanamo, you know, quit using military force as the

  • only way to respond, and here's how we're going to do that, and you then have a reaction

  • on the other side of the aisle, like, wait a minute, you know, why are you doing that?

  • So somehow we need to rebuild that consensus. And I write in the book about the first secretary

  • of state I ever met was Dean Acheson. That's because I went to college with his granddaughter.

  • And so I met him on the Graduation Day. She introduced me to him, and he had just finished

  • "Present at the Creation." He also scared me. He was very tall and imposing.

  • (LAUGHTER)

  • And his granddaughter said, "Oh, Grandfather, this is Hillary Rodham. She's going to give

  • the student speech at commencement tomorrow." And he looked down at me and goes, "Well,

  • I will be listening very carefully."

  • (LAUGHTER)

  • I mean, it was like, "Oh, no."

  • (LAUGHTER)

  • So I rushed back to the dorm and pulled my last all-nighter in college trying to figure

  • out what to say. But if you look at the way that we created a consensus because of the

  • threat of communism and the dangers posed by the Soviet Union, post-World War II, going

  • forward until certainly the collapse of the Soviet Union -- there were disagreements.

  • Don't get me wrong. There were a lot of disagreements, but there was a core consensus. And we need

  • to rebuild that. That's one of our problems right now.

  • HAASS: Yes, let's open it up to questions from our members. Please keep them short,

  • and wait for a microphone. Sure, Susan?

  • QUESTION: Hi, Susan Levine. Well, we know you in so many different ways, as first lady,

  • as senator, as secretary of state, and now, again, we're hoping as presidential candidate,

  • and I think many of us are hoping to see that happen again. But yesterday, we saw something

  • quite dramatic in American politics, the defeat of Eric Cantor. Everybody didn't expect this

  • -- his internal pollsters, the leadership.

  • HAASS: There's a question here somewhere.

  • QUESTION: I'm curious what you think the implications of this loss are for the -- you know, for

  • the future of American politics?

  • CLINTON: Well, Susan, I'm not sure we totally know. I mean, it's been very recent that it

  • happened. I think it shows the continuing conflict within the Republican Party over

  • its direction, and that will be a challenge. It may not affect necessarily the outcome

  • of the elections in November. We'll see. But it will certainly have long-term implications

  • for 2016 and maybe beyond.

  • I think the contrast between Senator Graham's rather easy re-nomination compared to Congressman

  • Cantor's loss on the issue of immigration is telling. And I think, from what I read

  • in the papers, what Graham said is, you know, when you're for something, you need to be

  • all-in and not try to be half in, half out.

  • But I don't know that we really can draw conclusions yet, other than it's going to be an interesting

  • leadership struggle within the Republican Party.

  • HAASS: Jamie?

  • QUESTION: Jamie Metzl, and thank you so much for being here. One of the many foreign policy

  • successes of your tenure -- this is a good introduction for a nice supportive question...

  • CLINTON: Yeah, I like that. Keep going.

  • (LAUGHTER)

  • QUESTION: ... was the -- the opening in -- the opening to and transition in Burma, in Myanmar.

  • CLINTON: Right.

  • QUESTION: I'm just back from North Korea, which is, obviously, a very tragic place.

  • In your view, are there any lessons from Burma that might be applied to finding opportunities

  • for engaging with North Korea?

  • CLINTON: Well, I will return the favor and say that's a great question, because...

  • (LAUGHTER)

  • ... we thought a lot about that, Jamie. With respect to Burma, when I came in, very early

  • in my tenure, because as senator I had been wondering if there were a different approach

  • we could take toward Burma. And in -- and making my rounds before confirmation, I met,

  • as I write in the book, with Mitch McConnell, and he had been a leader in the efforts to

  • sanction Burma and he'd been a staunch supporter of Aung San Suu Kyi.

  • So just sitting there, before we'd even gotten the administration sworn in, I asked him if

  • he would support me in trying a different approach. He was very skeptical, but he basically

  • said he would stand back and watch. And as we're walking out the door, he points to a

  • handwritten note from Aung San Suu Kyi, and he said, you know, unless she's out, unless

  • she can fully participate, you will not have my support. If you can figure out how to move

  • things or support those who are moving things in that direction, OK.

  • So we began very quietly. I started sending diplomats. I sent my excellent assistant secretary

  • of state, Kurt Campbell. He met with Aung San Suu Kyi, and he met with some of the generals

  • who were transitioning.

  • Fast-forward, there were a number of factors at work, including the openness that the generals

  • began to exhibit because they traveled enough in the region that they saw what was happening

  • in Thailand and in Indonesia, even in Cambodia. And they would come home and, you know, the

  • currency was non-exchangeable. There were no cellphones. It was just such a stark difference

  • from what had been one of the most vibrant places in the early 20th century.

  • So there was an internal calculation that the generals began going through. And when

  • they took office, we immediately began to work with them and to see whether we could

  • support them in making even greater changes. And when I finally went and met with Suu Kyi,

  • she was very clear that she was going to participate. She was not just going to be satisfied with

  • the ending of house arrest; she was going to go into politics. And I said, "Good luck."

  • (LAUGHTER)

  • Moving from, you know, in her case, an icon to a politician is a big personal transformation.

  • And we've had lots of conversations since.

  • In North Korea, we started with the same mindset. You know, we sent signals. We sent messages.

  • That's when the father, as opposed to the son, were in charge. We worked hard with the

  • Chinese to see if there couldn't be some kind of tradeoff. Open up your economy. There's

  • no reason you can't do better. You can be part of the economic miracle of Northeast

  • Asia.

  • Whether or not -- and when my -- when my husband went, when we asked my husband to go bring

  • back the two journalists who had been captured, he came back with his antenna vibrating, and

  • he said, you know, I think there's some potential here. You know, there were a lot of questions

  • he was asked by Kim Jong-il and some of the leading advisers. And he thought maybe there

  • was something that was possible.

  • Then, Kim Jong-un comes in and you know the rest of the story. And this really requires

  • the Chinese to be very active participants, but he, the young leader, is suspicious of

  • them, too. So we don't have a lot of interlocutors who can influence this or can open it up.

  • But it still is a very good question, and it's a good long-term project.

  • HAASS: Sure. OK, well, try...

  • QUESTION: Madam Secretary, good morning. Henry Breed from the U.N. Cross-border issue that

  • I know is of some interest of you -- to you, the question of poaching and particularly

  • the question of ivory.

  • CLINTON: Yes.

  • QUESTION: Could you share with us some of your thoughts?

  • CLINTON: Well, amen. And thank you for asking, because this is a much bigger security and

  • strategic issue than had earlier been recognized. And my daughter is with me, and I give her

  • credit, because one of her NBC reports really crystallized my thinking. She went to Kenya

  • and she reported about a lot of the poaching and rescuing baby elephants. And it piqued

  • my curiosity to, you know, really look hard at this.

  • And so as secretary of state, before I left, I announced a policy that we were going to

  • do more to support anti-poaching, not just for conservation reasons -- as important as

  • that is -- but because terrorists and insurgent groups of all kinds were using elephant poaching

  • -- rhinoceros, as well, but principally elephant poaching -- to make money, to buy better arms,

  • to be able to be more deadly in their efforts, al-Shabaab, Lord's Resistance Army, the Sudanese,

  • the Janjaweed.

  • So we began to track what these groups were doing, and they were now the heavy-duty poachers.

  • They have the automatic weapons and the night-vision goggles. They were killing more than 1,000

  • rangers up until this date. And so I began talking to President Obama about this, and

  • the African countries were really at a loss, because they would increase rangers and somewhere

  • else would be poached. They would move rangers and the rangers in the first place would be

  • murdered. It was just a terrible security issue for them, and there was lot of ungoverned

  • territory that was being invaded by the poachers.

  • So the president, at my request, raised it with Xi Jinping, because it's obviously both

  • a supply and a demand issue. Chelsea and I worked through the Clinton Global Initiative

  • to bring the major conservation groups, primarily American, but also international, together

  • to come up with a unified plan, because some groups were more active in one country than

  • another and we needed to get everybody pulling in the same direction.

  • And I'm pleased that, although we have not turned the tide -- there are still 35,000

  • elephants being killed, murdered for their tusks -- we're beginning to see on both the

  • supply and the demand side some actions being taken. So this is a security issue, as well

  • as a conservation issue, and I appreciate the work that CITES and the U.N. and various

  • instruments of the international community are doing to help.

  • HAASS: Mort Zuckerman?

  • QUESTION: I'm delighted to be here, and I'm going to ask you an easy question, which is...

  • CLINTON: Never. Never, I know.

  • QUESTION: ... how do you assess the merger the Palestinian Authority and Hamas, in terms

  • of their role in dealing with any possible negotiated outcome between the Palestinians

  • and the Israelis?

  • CLINTON: Well, Mort, as you know better than I -- and most -- this is an unfortunate development.

  • And whether it can be turned into some potential opportunity or not, it's too soon to tell.

  • With the collapse of the -- the recent efforts -- and I went down the same path. I was able

  • to manage to get the leaders together three times. The president had them together an

  • additional time. And we went through all of that, and I write about it in the book in

  • some detail about, you know, Netanyahu's announcement, which I called unprecedented -- because it

  • was -- of a settlement freeze in the West Bank, the pressure Abbas was under that was

  • making it very difficult for him to enter into negotiations, we went through all of

  • that.

  • In my time, we were constantly speaking out against the Fatah-Hamas merger to create some

  • kind of unified government. We were aided in that, first, by Mubarak and then even,

  • to some extent, by Morsi, because they were unsure of what that would mean, and so nothing

  • came of it. Now there is this announcement of a technocratic government.

  • I'd make three quick points. One, I think for the time being, serious negotiations are

  • understandably put off. And that's partly because they collapsed, but it's also partly

  • because Israel, the U.S., and others have to assess what this merger really means.

  • Secondly, if they hold elections, which they say they're going to -- I'm not sure they

  • will -- but if they hold elections, I sure hope Fatah understands the rules of the election,

  • because the last time, in the Bush administration, the elections were pushed -- I was against

  • them, quietly. I said, I don't think this is a good idea. But it was part of our, you

  • know, promoting democracy efforts.

  • But then the election was designed in such a way that everybody on Fatah ran, and sometimes

  • there were two candidates in one slot, and there was one Hamas candidate. So although

  • they did not win a majority of the votes, they won a majority of the elected legislators.

  • And, of course, you know, that was not the outcome anybody wanted, and Fatah was surprised,

  • because they thought votes meant elected leaders and they didn't understand the way it was

  • set up.

  • Thirdly, I don't know what's going to happen in Gaza. I think that Fatah has been -- has

  • continued to pay thousands of workers in Gaza. A lot of the economy of Gaza, such as it is,

  • has been supported by Fatah, which by indirection is Israel, because of the passing on of the

  • tax revenues in part. If those workers, those thousands of workers in Gaza are not paid

  • because Israel cuts off the passing of the revenues, I think that will create an even

  • worse situation than potentially what we're going to see anyway.

  • So there are a lot of hard choices, to coin a phrase...

  • HAASS: Coin a phrase, yeah.

  • (LAUGHTER)

  • CLINTON: ... yes -- in this, but I hope that we follow it closely and make no big decisions

  • right now until we figure out better what's actually happening on the ground.

  • HAASS: Yes, ma'am?

  • QUESTION: Thank you. Maria McFarland from Human Rights Watch. I appreciate what you

  • said about the need for a new rules-based order and the need to move away from the abuses

  • committed in the war on terror. But there are still 150 men in Guantanamo. Even the

  • Senate report on torture hasn't been made public yet. How do we move forward on this?

  • CLINTON: Well, on those two points specifically, I know that there is continuing pressure to

  • release the Senate report. I am hopeful it will get released. Now, I assume there will

  • be redactions, but there's a fight over how much will be redacted.

  • But I think it is important -- I was not one of those who thought it was necessarily wise

  • to ignore everything that had happened. I thought we needed more transparency. I didn't

  • want people to be criminally prosecuted, people who were doing what they were told to do,

  • that there were legal opinions supporting what they were told to do, but I wanted transparency.

  • And that's what Dianne Feinstein is trying to provide with that 6,000-page report. And

  • I think the American people deserve to see it.

  • On Guantanamo, you're well aware of the difficulty. I mean, the president came into office determined

  • to close Guantanamo. I know the White House worked very hard. We worked in the State Department

  • to find places to send prisoners that nobody thought were dangerous. You might remember

  • there was a late-night flight to Bermuda with some of the Uighurs who are still, I think,

  • working at a golf course.

  • (LAUGHTER)

  • And then there were five other Uighurs taken to Palau, who are trying to get, you know,

  • some onward destination. So we did move people out, as the Bush administration moved people

  • out. The Congress continued to tighten the rules. Now, that's part of the big debate

  • about Bergdahl, that you have to tell us, you have to sign off on, you know, you can't

  • move anybody. I think that infringes on the president's constitutional authority, but

  • this is a big debate, and I know the president is committed to trying to move those who can

  • be moved out under appropriate conditions, which is what they say has been negotiated

  • with Qatar, and find places for others, but then some will have to be moved to maximum

  • security.

  • We do a pretty good job -- we do a really good job with maximum security imprisonment.

  • We have a bunch of terrorists in maximum security facilities around the country. So we know

  • how to do this, but there's all kinds of reasons why members of Congress don't want that to

  • happen. So I think the president is pursuing it, doing all that he thinks he can do.

  • HAASS: We've only got a minute or two left, so I'm going to squeeze in one or two last

  • questions. You note in the book that there's no Obama doctrine for American foreign policy.

  • Is there a Clinton doctrine?

  • CLINTON: Well, there are -- there are certainly principles that I tried to follow. One I mentioned,

  • trying to renew and modernize a rules-based order, which is very much in our interest

  • and I think needs much greater attention than we've given it, on both the economic and the

  • political front.

  • Secondly, we have to do a better job mobilizing for common action, and that requires those

  • relationship-building efforts that I was referring to. The United States can't act as though

  • we are a unilateral power, even though we are by far stronger in economic terms still

  • today and certainly in military terms, but we have to be constantly looking for more

  • partners, and as much as possible, having them participate and take responsibility.

  • And then, thirdly, what I tried to do was to rebalance foreign policy. Defense, diplomacy,

  • and development was not a slogan. It was a mission. We had to do development better.

  • We made some advances, not enough, in my view. And on diplomacy, we had to modernize it.

  • When I got there, most members of the State Department were not issued, you know, cellphones,

  • BlackBerries. They were considered security risks.

  • I'm laughing at Judith McHale, who was my undersecretary for public diplomacy, just

  • to be able to equip our diplomats with modern tools so that they could go out and do the

  • work that was necessary and to look at these trend lines. We had a couple of very successful

  • programs. I give President Bush credit in the book for PEPFAR, you know, the program

  • that made it possible to both treat many more millions of people on AIDS and prevent transmission,

  • and he's very popular in sub-Saharan Africa because people believe that he cared about

  • them. That is a strategic advantage.

  • So, yes, I got into some trouble when I made a speech in Africa saying, you know, think

  • carefully about what kind of help you want. If the only offer from a foreign power, whether

  • it's a former colonial power or Asian power or South American power, is to, you know,

  • take your resources away from you, think hard about that. But if the offer is to help save

  • mothers and babies and prevent the transmission of AIDS, that's about helping the people be

  • empowered so they can make better decisions for themselves.

  • Our development agenda is a great diplomatic tool, and we need to use it more, so we started

  • a program called Feed the Future, because we're going to have food challenges. We're

  • going to have a lot of food insecurity. Climate change, which I also write about at some length,

  • is going to make it harder to grow crops and to maintain their viability by getting them

  • to a market in time.

  • Well, the United States has the biggest feeding program in the world. We don't do much to

  • talk about that. It doesn't make headlines. We've got 3 million people we are influencing

  • with Feed the Future, farmers who are doing a better job. That's part of the American

  • story.

  • And what happens when I, as secretary of state, travel around, I go to these countries, and

  • leaders often say to me, "You know, you're not doing very much for us." And I say, "Well,

  • what do you mean?" They say, "Well, you know, the Chinese built this parliament building,

  • and the Japanese built this soccer field." I said, "We spend more money than them combined

  • and we keep your women alive, we keep your babies surviving, we stamp out disease, we

  • feed you in earthquakes and storms. What do you mean we're not doing anything?"

  • But unless that story is repeated over and over again, the big shiny ball is seen by

  • people, and people then say to themselves, "What is America doing for us? You know, we

  • know what others are doing for us," and we spend far more money trying to help.

  • So I was convinced that leading with our values, being very candid that, yes, the United States

  • has interests and security paramount and we're going to pursue those, but we also have values

  • that we are determined to exemplify and to embed.

  • So I think it -- whether it adds up a fancy, you know, doctrine or whether it's a sort

  • of practical, principled approach, it's what guided me for four years.

  • HAASS: Last question. What is it you would then say to Americans -- that's the message

  • you would send to the world -- what is it you tell to Americans that they ought to pay

  • attention to the world? Because it's quite possible the next president will inherit an

  • incredibly difficult, challenging, messy world at a time the American people want very little

  • part of it.

  • CLINTON: Right.

  • HAASS: What is -- how do you persuade Americans not to turn their backs on the world?

  • CLINTON: I think you -- you have to start from a very simple premise, that America matters

  • to the world and the world matters to America, that in an interconnected, interdependent

  • world like the one in which we all live in, our jobs, our economic growth, investment

  • opportunities are very much connected with what goes on in the rest of the world.

  • Making sure we do have that rules-based order, so that companies that are trying to do business

  • have as level a playing field as we can possibly help them to obtain. Creating an argument

  • for Americans who are incredibly generous, that by helping others we demonstrate our

  • values, which in turn comes home to help us.

  • And the argument on the other side of the coin, by retreating from the world, we will

  • find ourselves once more with danger and peril at our doorstep, or certainly at the doorsteps

  • of our friends and allies, and I think the argument has to be made, even though there

  • is a growing narrative against American involvement, but I think it's primarily American military

  • involvement, and I think the president has read the American public well. That may not

  • always lead to the consequences one wishes, but he understands that Americans really don't

  • want to be sending our young men and women into combat where the outcome is uncertain,

  • the cost is really high, and where we get no credit for having sacrificed to help other

  • people.

  • I mean, it's -- it's a -- it's a totally understandable posture for Americans to be in, but leadership

  • requires standing up and saying, you know what, we don't want to do that, but occasionally

  • we will have to. We can't be uninvolved, because that, too, can cause us problems that we then

  • pay the price for.

  • It's got to be a conversation, Richard, an ongoing conversation with the American people.

  • And you can't shy from the conversation. And you also have to be prepared to answer the

  • tough questions about, what's it going to cost and what do we get out of it?

  • HAASS: Hillary Clinton, good luck with the book and all else.

  • CLINTON: Thank you. Thank you.

  • (APPLAUSE)

  • Thank you so much.

HAASS: Well, good morning. I'm Richard Haass, and I want to welcome all of you here, as

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