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  • Transcript of Chairman Bernanke's Press Conference January 25,

  • 2012 CHAIRMAN BERNANKE.

  • Good afternoon and welcome.

  • In my opening remarks I will briefly review today's policy decision

  • by the Federal Open Market Committee.

  • And then I'll discuss next the consensus statement that has been distributed

  • to you regarding the Committee's longer-run policy goals and strategy.

  • And finally, I'll place today's policy decision in the context

  • of our economic projections and our assessments

  • of the appropriate path of monetary policy.

  • And I'll then, of course, be glad to take your questions.

  • As indicated in the statement released earlier this afternoon,

  • to support a stronger economic recovery and to help ensure that inflation,

  • over time, is at levels consistent with our statutory mandate,

  • the Committee expects to maintain a highly accommodative stance

  • for monetary policy.

  • In particular, the Committee decided to keep the target range

  • for the federal funds rate at 0 to ¼ percent and currently anticipates

  • that economic conditions are likely to warrant exceptionally low levels

  • for the federal funds rate at least until late 2014.

  • To provide support for the recovery in the context of price stability,

  • the Committee will also continue the program that we announced in September

  • to extend the average maturity of the Federal Reserve's holdings of securities.

  • Following careful deliberations,

  • Committee participants have reached broad agreement on a statement

  • that sets forth our longer-run goals and policy strategy.

  • This statement should not be interpreted as indicating any change

  • in how the Federal Reserve conducts monetary policy.

  • Rather, its purpose is to increase the transparency

  • and predictability of policy.

  • There is today widespread agreement that clear

  • and transparent central bank communications facilitate well informed

  • decisionmaking by households and businesses,

  • reduce economic and financial uncertainty,

  • increase the effectiveness of monetary policy,

  • and enhance accountability to the public.

  • The statement begins by noting the Committee's firm commitment

  • to fulfill our statutory mandate of promoting maximum employment, stable prices,

  • and moderate long-term interest rates.

  • Since monetary policy actions tend to influence economic activity

  • and prices with a lag, our decisions appropriately reflect the Committee's

  • longer-run goals, our medium-term outlook, and our assessment of the balance

  • of risks, including risks to the financial system

  • that could impede the attainment of our goals.

  • An important aspect of policy transparency is clarity about policy objectives.

  • With respect to the objective of price stability,

  • it is essential to recognize that the inflation rate

  • over the longer run is primarily determined by monetary policy,

  • and hence the Committee has the ability

  • to specify a longer-run goal for inflation.

  • The Committee judges that inflation at the rate of 2 percent,

  • as measured by the annual change in the price index

  • for personal consumption expenditures, is most consistent over the longer run

  • with our statutory mandate.

  • Over time, a higher inflation rate would reduce the public's ability

  • to make accurate longer-term economic and financial decisions,

  • whereas a lower inflation rate would be associated with an elevated probability

  • of falling into deflation, which can lead to significant economic problems.

  • Clearly communicating to the public this 2 percent goal for inflation

  • over the longer run should help foster price stability

  • and moderate long-term interest rates and will enhance the Committee's ability

  • to promote maximum employment in the face of significant economic disturbances.

  • Maximum employment stands on an equal footing with price stability

  • as an objective of monetary policy.

  • A difference with price stability is that the maximum level of employment

  • in a given economy is largely determined by nonmonetary factors

  • that affect the structure and dynamics of the labor market,

  • including demographic trends, the pace of technological innovation,

  • and a variety of other influences, including a range of economic policies.

  • Because monetary policy does not determine the maximum level of employment

  • that the economy can sustain in the longer term,

  • and since many of the determinants of maximum employment may change over time

  • or may not be directly measurable, it is not feasible for any central bank

  • to specify a fixed goal for the longer-run level of employment.

  • Although the Committee cannot freely choose a longer-run goal for employment,

  • it can estimate the level of maximum employment and use that estimate

  • to inform its policy decisions.

  • The Committee considers a wide range of indicators in making its assessments

  • of maximum employment, recognizing

  • that such assessments are necessarily uncertain

  • and subject to revision over time.

  • For example, in the latest set of projections that have been distributed to you,

  • Committee participants' estimates of the longer-run normal rate

  • of unemployment have a central tendency of 5.2 percent

  • to 6.0 percent-roughly unchanged from last January

  • but higher than the corresponding interval several years ago.

  • As I noted, the level of maximum employment is not immutable; in particular,

  • it could be increased by effective policies, such as education

  • and training that improve workforce skills.

  • If the Committee's assessments pointed to an increase

  • in the maximum attainable level of employment,

  • our policy strategy would be modified appropriately to aim at the higher level.

  • In setting monetary policy, the Committee seeks to mitigate deviations

  • of inflation from its mandate-consistent rate and deviations of employment

  • from our assessments of its maximum level.

  • These dual objectives are generally complementary.

  • For example, under present circumstances,

  • in which the unemployment rate is elevated and the inflation outlook is subdued,

  • the Committee judges that sustaining a highly accommodative stance

  • of monetary policy is consistent with promoting both objectives.

  • And in the longer term, low and stable inflation can help promote healthy growth

  • in output and employment.

  • Of course, circumstances may sometimes arise

  • in which the dual objectives are not complementary.

  • In such cases, the Committee follows a balanced approach

  • in promoting these two objectives, taking into account the magnitude

  • of the deviations and potentially different time horizons over which inflation

  • and employment are projected to return

  • to levels judged consistent with our mandate.

  • In other words, the Committee always treats its primary objectives

  • of price stability and maximum employment symmetrically,

  • and the stance of policy at any given time is determined by the size,

  • social cost, and expected evolution of the deviations of each

  • of the Committee's policy objectives from its desired level.

  • I will now turn to the economic projections of the 17 FOMC participants-that is,

  • 5 Board members and 12 Reserve Bank presidents-submitted

  • in conjunction with today's meeting.

  • The central tendencies and ranges of those projections for the years 2011

  • to 2014 and over the longer run are depicted in the figures

  • that have been distributed.

  • The longer-run projections-shown at the right

  • of each figure-represent participants' assessments of the rate

  • to which each variable will converge over time under appropriate monetary policy

  • and in the absence of further shocks to the economy.

  • Incoming information suggests that the economy has been expanding moderately,

  • notwithstanding some slowing in global growth.

  • The Committee expects the pace of economic growth to be,

  • over coming quarters-to be moderate over coming quarters,

  • reflecting ongoing drags from the housing sector

  • and still-tight credit conditions for many households and smaller businesses.

  • Specifically, participants' projections for the growth rate

  • of real gross domestic product

  • in 2012 have a central tendency of 2.2 to 2.7 percent.

  • Strains in global financial markets continue

  • to pose significant downside risks to that outlook.

  • Looking further ahead, economic activity is expected to accelerate gradually

  • in conjunction with strengthening consumer and business confidence,

  • improving financial conditions,

  • and the continuation of a highly accommodative stance for monetary policy.

  • Specifically, participants' GDP projections for 2013 have a central tendency

  • of 2.8 to 3.2 percent, and their projections for 2014 have a central tendency

  • of 3.3 to 4.0 percent, noticeably higher than the central tendency of 2.3

  • to 2.6 percent for their longer-run growth projections.

  • A number of recent indicators point to some further improvement

  • in overall labor market conditions, but the unemployment rate remains elevated.

  • Moreover, in light of the anticipated modest pace of economic recovery,

  • the Committee expects that over coming quarters the unemployment rate will

  • decline only gradually toward its mandate-consistent levels.

  • Indeed, participants' projections for the unemployment rate

  • in the fourth quarter of this year have a central tendency of 8.2 to 8.5 percent

  • that is little different from the latest monthly reading of 8.5 percent.

  • With economic growth expected to pick up somewhat over time,

  • the unemployment rate is expected to decline to 6.7 to 7.6 percent

  • by the fourth quarter of 2014-still well above participants' estimates

  • of the longer-run normal rate of unemployment.

  • I'll turn now to the outlook for inflation.

  • The prices of oil and other commodities have generally flattened out

  • or turned downward over the past couple of quarters,

  • while low levels of resource utilization have continued

  • to constrain the growth of labor costs.

  • Consequently, consumer price inflation-which surged in the first half

  • of last year-has been subdued in recent months.

  • Survey measures and financial market indicators imply

  • that longer-term inflation expectations have remained stable.

  • Over coming quarters, the Committee anticipates that inflation will run at

  • or below levels consistent with the mandate-consistent rate of 2 percent.

  • Specifically, participants' inflation projections have a central tendency of 1.4

  • to 1.8 percent for 2012 and remain subdued

  • at aroundto 2 percent through 2014.

  • As a further step in enhancing the clarity of our communications,

  • the Committee recently decided to begin publishing information

  • about participants' assessments of appropriate monetary policy-that is,

  • the path of policy that each participant judges as most likely

  • to foster mandate consistent outcomes for employment and inflation

  • if the economy evolves as expected.

  • These judgments about future policy underlie the participants' projections

  • of growth, unemployment, and inflation that I just described.

  • Rather-excuse me-Importantly,

  • these policy assessments should not be viewed as unconditional pledges.

  • Rather, just as with our economic projections,

  • these policy projections reflect the information available at the time

  • of the forecast and are subject to future revision in light

  • of evolving economic and financial conditions.

  • In the chart labeled "Appropriate Timing of Policy Firming,"

  • each shaded bar indicates the number of Committee participants who judge

  • that the initial increase in the target federal funds rate would appropriately

  • occur in the specified calendar year shown below the bar.

  • Six participants anticipate that policy firming is likely to commence in 2015

  • or 2016, while five others expect policy firming to commence in 2014.

  • The remaining six participants judge

  • that policy liftoff would be appropriate in 2012 or 2013.

  • More detail is provided by the chart labeled

  • "Appropriate Pace of Policy Firming."

  • In that chart, the dots depict the distribution

  • of participants' assessments regarding the appropriate level

  • of the target federal funds rate at the end of each

  • of the next several years and over the longer run.

  • For example, based on current information,

  • 11 participants expect that the appropriate federal funds rate at the end

  • of 2014 will be at or below 1 percent,

  • while 6 participants anticipate higher rates at that time.

  • In effect, those judgments are reflected in today's meeting statement,

  • in which the Committee indicated that economic conditions "are likely

  • to warrant exceptionally low levels for the federal funds rate

  • at least through late 2014."

  • As I have noted, we are also proceeding with the program that we announced

  • in September to extend the average maturity of the Federal Reserve's holding

  • of securities, thereby fostering more accommodative financial conditions

  • without changing the overall size of the Federal Reserve's balance sheet.

  • The Committee regularly reviews the size and composition

  • of our securities holdings, and we will adjust those holdings as appropriate.

  • In particular, the Committee recognizes the hardships imposed by high

  • and persistent unemployment and an underperforming economy,

  • and it is prepared to provide further monetary accommodation

  • if employment is not making sufficient progress toward our assessments

  • of its maximum level or if inflation shows signs

  • of moving further below its mandate-consistent rate.

  • Thank you for your patience.

  • I'll be happy to take your questions.

  • STEVE LIESMAN.

  • Thank you.

  • Steve Liesman, CNBC.

  • Mr. Chairman, we've had several months of economic data that's been stronger

  • than most forecasters expected-employment was over 200,000,

  • the unemployment rate's come down topercent-but there seems

  • to be very little mention of this recent strength in the statement.

  • Do you and the Committee, Mr. Chairman,

  • harbor doubts about the recent strength in the economy?

  • And are you and the Committee baking in additional quantitative easing in order

  • to achieve the growth rates that you've even forecast here?

  • Thank you.

  • CHAIRMAN BERNANKE.

  • Steve, there's certainly been some encouraging news recently.

  • We've seen slightly better performance in the labor market,

  • consumer sentiment has improved,

  • industrial production has been relatively strong-so there are some positive

  • signs, no doubt.

  • At the same time, we've had mixed results in some other areas,

  • such as retail sales, and we continue to see headwinds emanating from Europe,

  • coming from the slowing global economy and some other factors as well.

  • So, you know, we are obviously hoping that the strength we saw

  • in the fourth quarter and in recent data will continue into 2012,

  • but we're going to continue to monitor that situation.

  • I don't think we're ready to declare that we've entered a new,

  • stronger phase at this point; we'll continue to look at the data.

  • We will, as I've said in my statement,

  • and as we have in fact in the FOMC statement, you know,

  • we continue to review our holdings-our portfolio holdings, securities,

  • and we are prepared to take further steps in that direction if we see

  • that the recovery's faltering or if inflation is not moving toward target.

  • So that's something-that's an option that's certainly on the table.

  • I think it would be premature to say definitively one way or the other,

  • but we continue to look at that option, and if conditions warrant,

  • we will certainly consider using it.

  • BINYAMIN APPELBAUM.

  • Thank you.

  • I'm a little confused by these forecasts.

  • I was hoping you could sort of help me understand what we're looking at.

  • It seems to say that you expect that at the end of 2014, unemployment will be at

  • or above 7 percent, inflation will be at or below 2 percent-and

  • yet 11 of the 17 members of your Committee think that will be a good moment

  • to start raising interest rates again.

  • If unemployment and inflation are in fact symmetric objectives for the Fed,

  • how can that possibly be the case?

  • And is there any tolerance for above trend inflation

  • in the service of catch-up growth?

  • CHAIRMAN BERNANKE.

  • Well, let me first observe that we have in fact, of course,

  • been very accommodative in the last couple of years.

  • We've kept interest rates close to zero,

  • we've done two rounds of asset purchases, we have announced-today,

  • in fact-an extension of the period over which we expect to see rates very low,

  • and our maturity extension program is still ongoing,

  • so we maintain a quite accommodative path of policy at this point.

  • I would further say that I think it's important to emphasize

  • that we're not going to mechanically take the interest rate projections

  • that participants provide and just build policy off of that.

  • I mean, it's still going to be necessary for the Committee

  • to exercise collective judgment, to consider the costs

  • and risks of additional policy actions,

  • to discuss the uncertainty about the forecast and other factors

  • that come into the policy decision.

  • Now, all that being said, if inflation is going to remain below target

  • for an extended period, and unemployment progress is very slow,

  • then I think your implicit question is right,

  • there is a case for additional policy action, and we'll-you know,

  • we want to continue to observe the situation,

  • but we're certainly prepared to look for different ways to provide support

  • to the economy if, in fact, we have this unsatisfactory situation.

  • CRAIG TORRES.

  • Hi, Mr. Chairman, Craig Torres from Bloomberg News.

  • Congrats on the inflation target,

  • or goal-that's a big achievement for you, I'm sure.

  • I'd like to ask if you could explain a little bit the way you think inflation is

  • now working in the economy.

  • The 2012 central tendency is kind of low, and along with that question,

  • I'd like to know where you think full employment is in the near term,

  • like the next year or two, given the structural impediments

  • that many Fed officials have been talking about.

  • CHAIRMAN BERNANKE.

  • Well, there are a number of factors that make us expect inflation

  • to be quite low in the next couple of years.

  • Certainly, we are seeing a reversal, or at least a flattening out,

  • of the commodity price increases

  • that caused headline inflation to rise earlier in 2011.

  • And the futures markets, and our own estimates of supply and demand globally

  • with the slowing global economy, suggest that most likely-although, of course,

  • there's a lot of uncertainty-that commodity prices will remain well controlled

  • over the next couple of years.

  • On top of that, of course, we have a very high rate of unemployment;

  • pressure on wages is quite restrained.

  • And putting that together with strong productivity gains,

  • the costs of production-unit labor costs-are growing very slowly.

  • Expectations of inflation seem well anchored and, in fact,

  • have been on the low side relative to recent history in recent months.

  • So for all those reasons, inflation looks to be at

  • or modestly below the 2 percent target going forward.

  • With respect to the maximum employment measure,

  • we provided a-we have been providing, in fact, for four years,

  • as long as we've been providing the economic projections-an estimate

  • of the long-run sustainable rate of unemployment,

  • which is currently-the central tendency is currently 5.2 to 6 percent.

  • That is higher than it was a couple of years ago,

  • reflecting structural impediments and other changes.

  • We're concerned that the large amount

  • of long-term unemployment may be causing some workers to lose skills

  • or lose labor force attachment, which, at least for a while,

  • will also likely increase the so-called natural rate,

  • or sustainable rate, of unemployment.

  • So there are a number of factors working in that direction.

  • But in any case, while there's certainly a lot of uncertainty about exactly

  • where the natural rate of unemployment is, clearly, atpercent,

  • I think we're comfortably above anybody's estimate, and for that reason,

  • we still consider the labor market to be obviously quite slack.

  • JON HILSENRATH.

  • Thank you.

  • Jon Hilsenrath from the Wall Street Journal.

  • Mr. Chairman, how much confidence do you have in the FOMC's ability

  • to forecast the economy and inflation out three years?

  • And consequently, how much confidence do you have

  • in the interest rate projections that the Fed has made public today,

  • particularly the ones that go out to 2014 and beyond?

  • And if I may add a follow-up to that,

  • there seems to be an asymmetry in these dots in that there's a view

  • that the view that matters the most to the Fed is the view of the Chairman.

  • So when we look at these projections,

  • are we really seeing the most likely expected path of interest rates

  • because the Chairman's view isn't represented exclusively here?

  • CHAIRMAN BERNANKE.

  • Well, your first question-our ability to forecast three and four years

  • out is obviously very limited, there's no question about that.

  • Nevertheless, we have to make a best guess, a provisional plan,

  • in the same way that a firm making an investment has to make a best guess

  • or provisional plan about where the economy and the industry is going

  • to be over a number of years.

  • And so it's certainly possible that we will be either too optimistic

  • or too pessimistic, in which case we'll have to adjust both our forecasts

  • and our policy expectations.

  • That being said, you know, currently,

  • the zero lower bound on policy rates-at least according

  • to many estimates-is still binding; that is,

  • even if the economy were a bit stronger,

  • the very low interest rates we currently have would still be valid,

  • still be appropriate.

  • And so for that reason, unless there's a substantial strengthening

  • of the economy in the near term, I would think that it's a pretty good guess

  • that we will be keeping rates low for some time from now.

  • We don't identify the specific individuals who provide the projections.

  • Among other reasons, we want to make sure that people come

  • to the meeting willing to talk and not be wedded to a specific position,

  • and that's why, again, the Committee makes a collective decision after using

  • as input these projections, which are circulated to all the members

  • of the Committee before the meeting

  • so that they can see what their colleagues believe.

  • As far as what individual members do believe,

  • we certainly have other vehicles for expressing our views.

  • All of us give speeches, all of us give interviews and are-you know,

  • I give frequent testimony, so there are plenty of opportunities to get a sense

  • of what individual members believe.

  • But again, we felt that this information, which presents both the diversity

  • of views in the Committee but also shows

  • where the central tendencies lie, would be useful.

  • And I guess I might add to that, you know, the Chairman's term is not infinite

  • and at some point there'll be a new Chairman,

  • but there's a lot more continuity on the FOMC collectively.

  • The average Bank president is on the FOMC for as much as 10 years

  • and Governors' terms are 14 years.

  • So even as the Chairman changes, much of the FOMC remains continuous.

  • So, as we talk about interest rates in 2014,

  • the fact that there is quite wide-ranging agreement

  • that interest rates will be low for a long time, should give you more confidence

  • that that's not dependent on a single individual.

  • GREG IP. Greg Ip of the Economist.

  • Mr. Chairman, the Fed's statutory goals are price stability

  • and maximum employment, but traditionally the Fed has interpreted

  • that somewhat flexibly in the sense that if there was a conflict

  • between the two, they would push for price stability rather

  • than for full employment on the view that over time,

  • stable prices was the best contribution monetary policy could make

  • to maximum employment.

  • But today you went to some pains to say that, actually,

  • you treat these goals-put them on an equal footing,

  • and that there might be circumstances in which you put one above the other.

  • So following up a little bit on Binyamin's question,

  • do I take it that if inflation were to move somewhat

  • above your 2 percent preferred level, that you would tolerate that in order

  • to make further progress on unemployment?

  • CHAIRMAN BERNANKE.

  • Well, the period of time, yes, we treat them symmetrically.

  • We cannot control, of course, where inflation and unemployment are

  • at each moment in time, and so there will be periods when,

  • for reasons outside of our control,

  • inflation and unemployment will move away from their desired levels.

  • If-In those situations, the speed at which-I think

  • "tolerate" might be too strong of a word,

  • because we always want to get everything, both sides of the mandate,

  • back to their desired levels-but the speed at which we would enforce

  • that return would depend on what's happening with the other variable.

  • So, for example, if inflation did go above target by a modest amount,

  • we would certainly try to get it back down to target,

  • but if unemployment were very high, that would lead us to be more cautious

  • and slower in returning to target.

  • So that's why "medium term"-which is,

  • these targets are all medium term-is a flexible concept,

  • and it depends on the initial conditions, how far away the two key variables are

  • from their objectives at the beginning of the process.

  • GREG ROBB.

  • Greg Robb, MarketWatch.

  • Mr. Chairman, thank you.

  • You haven't had a very good time in all the Republican presidential debates,

  • and I was wondering if I could have your comment on what you've heard.

  • And some of the analysts I talked to said that one of the reasons

  • for this hostility, perhaps, is that a lot of the Republican primary voters are

  • on fixed incomes and have an inability to invest

  • and make money with their funds.

  • So could you talk to them as well?

  • And one more thing, if Republicans take back the White House in November

  • and ask you to resign, would you?

  • CHAIRMAN BERNANKE.

  • So I'm not going to get involved in political rhetoric.

  • I'm just going to stay completely away from that.

  • I have a job to do, and as long as I'm here,

  • I will do everything I can to help the Federal Reserve achieve its dual mandate

  • of price stability and maximum employment.

  • That's my answer to the last part as well.

  • I'm not going to be thinking about hypothetical situations in the future.

  • In the case of savers, you know, we think about all these issues,

  • and we certainly recognize that the low interest rates that we're using to try

  • to stimulate investment and expansion of the economy also impose a cost

  • on savers who have a lower return.

  • And we do hear about that, obviously, and we do think about that.

  • I guess the response I would make is that the savers

  • in our economy are dependent on a healthy economy

  • in order to get adequate returns.

  • In particular, people own stocks and corporate bonds and other securities

  • as well as, say, Treasury securities, and if our economy is in really bad shape,

  • then they are not going to get good returns on those investments.

  • So I think what we need to do, as is often the case when the economy goes

  • into a very weak situation, then low interest rates are needed

  • to help restore the economy to something closer to full employment

  • and to increase growth and that, in turn, will lead ultimately to higher returns

  • across all assets for savers and investors.

  • So that's-I think that's how we would explain it.

  • But again, you know, we recognize that during periods like this,

  • savers are getting a lower return.

  • One reason why it's extremely important for us to maintain price stability,

  • of course, is that at least that minimizes any losses due

  • to inflation that savers might suffer.

  • DONNA BORAK.

  • Hi, Chairman.

  • Donna Borak of American Banker.

  • Shifting a little bit, I'd like to take a look back to the rules

  • that the Fed released back in late December.

  • Obviously, it was a mammoth task for Fed staff to put forth,

  • and considered the heart of Dodd-Frank.

  • There were certain provisions that were left out,

  • including the liquidity requirements,

  • due largely to the fact that there's global consensus needed

  • on those rules in the Basel III process.

  • But I was hoping you could expand a little bit more on the decision

  • for Fed staff to forgo specifying what the additional capital requirements would

  • be for those banks that were not necessarily deemed GSIBs, at least now,

  • but were still above the $50 billion threshold,

  • and to talk a little bit about what the core issues are in deciding whether

  • or not that additional capital should come in the form of a surcharge,

  • what that surcharge might look like, and when we might know.

  • CHAIRMAN BERNANKE.

  • Well, you're referring, I think, to the 165-166 rules,

  • which will focus on the supervisory oversight of the largest banks.

  • It's a very big and complicated rule, as everyone knows,

  • and so our position at this time is that we would still like to get feedback

  • from the industry and from the public about what the best approach is.

  • So we put out a lot of questions,

  • and we'll be considering those during the comment period

  • and after, as we put together a rule.

  • The notion of the surcharges is that banks which do not pose significant threats

  • to the systemic stability of Unites States, you know,

  • should not have a significant surcharge.

  • We're required to consider these issues by Dodd-Frank,

  • but our view is that it's the largest banks,

  • the ones whose failure would endanger our financial system,

  • that should be subject to these surcharges because,

  • first-because we need to have them be safer than smaller banks, and secondly,

  • because we want to try to equalize the cost of credit that they face.

  • In other words, a bank which is thought to be too big

  • to fail gets an artificial subsidy in the interest rate that it can borrow at,

  • and by having additional capital requirements, that tends to equalize the cost

  • of funding to different banks and reduces the incentive of banks

  • to get large just to create the impression of being too big to fail.

  • So we think those are important and we will continue to work with them.

  • The Basel Committee has provided some sense of the range

  • of what those surcharges will fall into,

  • and so we're still working on defining exactly the criteria,

  • but you can assume that it will be a fairly continuous range

  • between the $50 billion banks and the very largest banks in our economy.

  • As I said, we're getting reactions and comments.

  • We hope to get-you know, early this year-we hope to come back

  • with a clarification on the rule, and of course,

  • we're also working hard on implementing Basel III itself,

  • which we want to do during 2012-we want to put out the rule during 2012.

  • MARK FELSENTHAL.

  • Mark Felsenthal with Reuters.

  • Mr. Chairman, for more than three years now,

  • the Fed has conducted policy through extraordinary means,

  • and yet the new information that we have today pertains mostly

  • to an eventual tightening of policy through raising interest rates.

  • Why is there no new information about the size of the Fed's balance sheet,

  • and what should anybody looking at your communications today deduce

  • about an eventual expansion of the balance sheet through more asset purchases?

  • CHAIRMAN BERNANKE.

  • So we will be providing, in our minutes and in our Survey

  • of Economic Projections, which will be released

  • in three weeks-we'll be providing some additional qualitative information

  • about peoples'-participants' views of the balance sheet going forward.

  • The reason that I can't provide all that information now is basically

  • that we received, you know, a whole range of qualitative comments,

  • and we had further discussion during the meeting yesterday and today, and so,

  • you know, we're going to need a little time to summarize that

  • and to have it approved by, you know-the minutes, of course,

  • and the SEP are approved by the entire Committee-and so, in that respect,

  • it will be a definitive statement

  • about what we currently know about the balance sheet.

  • I can say a few things.

  • You know, one is that it certainly remains-expanding the balance sheet certainly

  • remains an option, one that we would consider very seriously if-in particular,

  • if progress toward full employment was continued, or it became more, inadequate,

  • or if inflation remained exceptionally low.

  • So we'll continue to look at that.

  • As we say in our statement, we're prepared to take additional measures

  • in general, and that would be certainly one class

  • of measures we would want to consider.

  • I can make one additional point, which maybe wasn't obvious, which is that,

  • in June, we provided some principles relating the sales of assets-ultimate sales

  • of assets-to the path of interest rates,

  • and those remain-those principles remain in force.

  • And so one implication of our extension of our expected point of takeoff

  • to late 2014 is to imply that the initial sales from our balance sheet,

  • which again are far down the road but-that begins-that will be later

  • than previously thought.

  • That will be presumably in 2015.

  • So we do expect to hold our balance sheet at a high level for a longer period.

  • Additional sales again-I'm sorry-Additional purchases remains a topic

  • that we are still debating, and it will depend both on our assessment

  • of the efficacy and the risks of that particular tool,

  • but also of how the economy is evolving.

  • ROBIN HARDING.

  • Robin Harding from the Financial Times.

  • Mr. Chairman, when I look at these forecasts for 2014,

  • the median of the forecast is, I think, 0.75 and the mean is 1.12 percent.

  • If I were to draw a line through this-these dots,

  • how should I draw it so I best understand what the FOMC is most likely to do?

  • And the second part-in the minutes,

  • you say that the Committee will consider further options for improvements

  • to the SEP, the economic projections.

  • Could you tell us a bit more about what further you might do?

  • Thank you.

  • CHAIRMAN BERNANKE.

  • Well, again, first I want to emphasize that there is no mechanical relationship

  • between these projections and the outcomes of the FOMC decisions.

  • Of course, they're a big input into those decisions,

  • but it's a collective decision.

  • If you want to draw lines, I guess I would-I guess my suggestion would be

  • to look at the median, the middle of the distribution,

  • because we do have a democratic process in the Committee,

  • and so the median would give you some sense of where the weight balances

  • against higher-in favor of higher or lower rates.

  • Again, we did note that in support of our assessment of late 2014,

  • which is a Committee decision, and of course there was a 9-to-1 vote in favor

  • of that, but that is supported by the observation that 11

  • of the 17 participants expect the funds rate at the end of 2014 to be 1 percent

  • or less, and so presumably the takeoff would not be much earlier than that.

  • In terms of future additions, there are a lot of ways we could go.

  • We could provide, for example, more relationships between-more information

  • about the relationship between individuals' policy preferences

  • and their forecasts, and so on.

  • But there's nothing specific now that has been decided.

  • We have a very capable subcommittee, which is charged with continual assessment

  • and analysis of possible ways of improving our transparency.

  • So we will be looking at additional possibilities,

  • and we would welcome feedback for that matter.

  • But there's nothing specific planned at this point.

  • DEREK KRAVITZ.

  • Derek Kravitz, Associated Press.

  • Last night the President unveiled a plan to revamp

  • and expand the government's refinancing program.

  • Essentially, the Fed released a white paper earlier this month that said that up

  • tomillion homeowners could benefit from this,

  • essentially save $3,000 per year in mortgage payments.

  • Right now there's a mortgage settlement being brokered

  • between state attorneys general and the nation's major mortgage lenders,

  • something to the tune of $25 billion,

  • much of which would be in the form of principal reduction.

  • In the white paper that was released earlier this month,

  • the Fed seemed to indicate that principal reduction could be helpful,

  • but it was unclear about whether they thought

  • that this was an acceptable or even feasible option.

  • They also made clear that a lot of the proposals that are currently out there

  • "eat around the edges," so to speak,

  • when you're dealing with a foreclosure crisis, and a lot of economists agree.

  • Do you think a principal reduction in the form

  • of the major mortgage settlement would do a lot to help the housing crisis?

  • And if not, is there any other alternative proposal that would help?

  • CHAIRMAN BERNANKE.

  • Well, the Federal Reserve obviously has a very strong interest

  • in the housing sector.

  • The weakness of the housing sector is an important reason why the economy is not

  • recovering more robustly, and the problems in housing finance are part

  • of the reason why monetary policy has not been more powerful-because part

  • of our transmission mechanism is through lower interest rates,

  • which affects refinancing; it affects sales and purchases as well.

  • So, in addition to that, as bank supervisors,

  • we have considerable interest in servicing, in loan modifications,

  • in delinquencies, and all the aspects of mortgage lending.

  • So we have a considerable interest in this area, and as you say,

  • we did a white paper, which looked at a number of issues,

  • including refinancing and mortgage finance.

  • I think it's important to say that our intent in that white paper was

  • to provide the benefit of our analysis to the public

  • and to those who will be making policy.

  • We did not take specific stands on individual issues.

  • What we tried to do was provide the pros and the cons

  • and provide some context for these debates.

  • So we did discuss refinancing, we did discuss principal forgiveness.

  • I would say that there's a variety of views about principal forgiveness

  • within the Federal Reserve System, and there is no official position.

  • There-It seems very likely that principal forgiveness could be helpful,

  • depending on how it's structured, in reducing delinquencies.

  • There are also some potential drawbacks; one of them is the fact that the amount

  • of negative equity in the United States is about $700 billion,

  • which is enormous, and so there is no conceivable program that is going

  • to put everybody in the country above water.

  • And so I think the issue then becomes, if we have $20 or $25 billion

  • or whatever the number may end up being in this settlement, you know,

  • what is the most cost-effective way to help as many people as possible?

  • And I think that's an ongoing debate.

  • But with respect to principal reduction, you know,

  • I've spoken about this in the past, and it certainly has some advantages;

  • a lot depends on how it's structured,

  • and a lot depends on what the alternatives are that you're considering.

  • PETER BARNES.

  • Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

  • Peter Barnes of FOX Business.

  • One of the goals of the Fed and the release of all these new materials,

  • the forecast, and the policy announcement are to help

  • to create expectations and set expectations.

  • But are you concerned at all that this-that the materials and the forecasts

  • and the policy announcement path today might help create negative expectations?

  • In other words, the average American's takeaway of your announcement

  • to keep interest rates low-exceptionally low, through 2014 now,

  • might signal to them that maybe the Fed thinks that the economy is

  • in much worse shape than we all thought, and that, in turn,

  • could affect consumer confidence, consumer spending,

  • and the ability to create a self-sustaining economic recovery at some point.

  • Is there a risk of this?

  • CHAIRMAN BERNANKE.

  • Well, whenever the Fed takes a policy action,

  • there's always some potential for a signal.

  • I mean, that's true not just in these current times, but anytime the Fed lowers

  • or increases interest rates, and that's something we have to think about.

  • But I think, generally speaking, that those considerations are outweighed

  • by the need to maintain accommodative financial conditions

  • so that it's attractive to firms to invest and hire,

  • attractive for those who are eligible to buy homes, and so on,

  • and I think that that ultimately is more powerful

  • than the signal from the change in policy.

  • In particular, the markets and the news media are very good at picking

  • up the underlying economic data and making assessments of the state

  • of the economy and reporting what different people think about the economy,

  • so I wouldn't overstate the Fed's ability to massively change expectations

  • through its statements, for example.

  • So, again, I think that while we certainly take that into account,

  • we think it's important for us to say what we think,

  • and we think it's important for us to provide the right amount of stimulus

  • to try to help our economy recover from its currently underutilized condition.

  • DARREN GERSH.

  • Darren Gersh, Nightly Business Report.

  • Let me kind of follow up on Peter's question.

  • Why shouldn't somebody looking at these numbers from the outside say "Look,

  • as aggressive as you say you've been, and as aggressive as you have been,

  • it doesn't look like you're meeting any of your goals for the next three years

  • on the economy, so why isn't the Fed doing more now?"

  • CHAIRMAN BERNANKE.

  • Well, again, as I said earlier, the Fed has been doing a great deal.

  • Just since August we have put a date

  • on our expected period of low interest rates.

  • We undertook the maturity extension program, which is still continuing.

  • Today we announced a further extension of the expected period of low rates.

  • By issuing this expected policy rate information,

  • we hope to convey to the market the extent to which there is support

  • on the Committee for maintaining rates at a low level for a significant time.

  • So, you know, I don't accept the premise that we've been passive;

  • we've been actually quite active in our policy, and in one respect,

  • the low level of inflation is a validation in the following sense,

  • that there were some who were very concerned that our balance sheet policies

  • and the like would lead to high inflation.

  • There's certainly no sign of that yet,

  • and it hasn't shown up either in financial markets

  • or in outside forecasters' expectations.

  • Now that being said, as I mentioned earlier, if the situation continues,

  • with inflation below target and unemployment declining at a rate which is very,

  • very slow, then more-our framework, the logic of our framework,

  • says we should be looking for ways to do more.

  • It's not completely straightforward because, of course,

  • we're now dealing with a variety

  • of nonstandard policy tools-we can't just lower the federal funds rate 25 basis

  • points like in the good old days-but your basic point is right, that, you know,

  • we need to adopt policies that will both achieve our inflation objectives

  • and help the economy recover as quickly as is feasible.

  • And, I would say that your question-actually,

  • an earlier question-shows a benefit of explaining this framework

  • because the framework makes very clear that we need to be thinking about ways

  • in which we can provide further stimulus if we don't get some improvement

  • in the pace of recovery and a normalization of inflation.

  • PATRICK WELTER.

  • Mr. Chairman, Patrick Welter from the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung.

  • I have two short questions.

  • Your predecessor, Mr. Greenspan,

  • once said about his personal inflation-long-term inflation goal

  • that it would be 0 percent if appropriately measured.

  • And I would like you to compare the inflation goal you told us

  • about today with that statement.

  • And, the second question is, Comparing what you did today,

  • are you approaching more some kind of inflation targeters like the central bank

  • of Sweden or Norway, or are you approaching more the European Central Bank,

  • for example, which has some kind of inflation goal

  • but is not really an inflation targeter?

  • CHAIRMAN BERNANKE.

  • Excellent questions.

  • So, a literal reading of price stability would say inflation should be at zero.

  • Now, there are some technical reasons why that may not be true.

  • There are probably some measurement biases and other issues that mean

  • that a measured value of inflation

  • above zero is probably consistent with stable prices.

  • But as we've talked about frequently, we set inflation-our inflation objective

  • in a way that was consistent with both sides of the mandate:

  • price stability-and 2 percent is low enough that we believe that it's not going

  • to extensively interfere with financial planning and economic planning

  • on the part of households and businesses-but also in the interest of employment.

  • A target for inflation that was zero would have several consequences.

  • First, we would be spending maybe half of our time,

  • or at least a significant amount of our time, in a deflationary zone.

  • And we've seen in many instances that deflation can be bad

  • for economic performance and bad for employment, and, therefore,

  • setting an inflation target at zero would be not consistent

  • with the other part of our mandate.

  • Incidentally, related to that, a zero inflation rate would mean

  • that nominal interest rates would be at very low levels,

  • typically 2 to 3 percent or whatever they might be,

  • and that would increase the risk and probability that we would be in a situation

  • like today where we really can't cut the short-term interest rate any further.

  • So I think there are good reasons from a dual-mandate perspective

  • to have inflation greater than 2 percent.

  • And I would add that, you know, if you look at central banks around the world,

  • whether they are nominal inflation targeters or not,

  • that 2 percent is basically the number that most central banks use; the ECB,

  • many other central banks either use 2 percent or a range around 2 percent.

  • So this is not at all different from what many other central banks do.

  • Now, are we inflation targeters?

  • If by "inflation targeter" you mean a central bank that puts top priority

  • on inflation and other goals, like employment,

  • as subsidiary goals, then the answer is no.

  • We are a dual-mandate central bank: We put equal weight on price stability

  • and maximum employment; those are the goals given to us by the Congress.

  • And so, in that respect, as I mentioned earlier, I think, to Greg,

  • we're not absolutists: If there's a need

  • to let inflation return a little bit more slowly to target in order

  • to get a better result in employment,

  • then that's something that we would be willing to do.

  • Having said all that, I think it's worth noting

  • that even banks that-central banks

  • that call themselves inflation targeters typically pay at least some attention

  • to other parts of the economy: employment, growth,

  • financial stability, and the like.

  • So I don't think there's really any central bank, or very few, at least,

  • that focus only on inflation.

  • But again, in terms of terminology, I guess I would reject that term

  • for the Federal Reserve because we are going to be evenhanded

  • in treating the price stability and maximum employment parts

  • of our mandate on a level footing.

  • ZACHARY GOLDFARB.

  • Thank you.

  • Zach Goldfarb from the Washington Post.

  • Two questions.

  • First, can you clarify whether

  • if actual economic conditions match their projections,

  • that's an acceptable future course, or that would require additional easing?

  • And secondly, in the past, a number of times you said that even

  • when interest rates are at the zero bound,

  • the Fed can still have a significant impact on influencing economic growth;

  • do you still believe that the Fed has the capacity to deploy tools

  • that would have a significant impact on bringing down unemployment

  • at a faster pace than we see in these projections if it chose to do so?

  • CHAIRMAN BERNANKE.

  • On the first question, I, you know-as was pointed out by Steve,

  • for example-we've had some good data recently.

  • I think there's some uncertainty about where the economy is going,

  • and we want to continue to observe how the economy is developing.

  • But I would say that, as I've said on several-in several answers,

  • that if recovery continues to be modest and progress on unemployment very slow,

  • and if inflation appears to be likely to be below target for a number

  • of years out-so the configuration we're talking

  • about in the projections-then I think there would be a very strong case,

  • based on our framework, for finding a different-additional tools

  • for expansionary policies or to support the economy.

  • So we'll continue to look at the different options

  • and try to decide what might be most effective.

  • We are in a difficult situation in terms of the effectiveness of policy tools.

  • My own view, thinking about the effects, for example,

  • of additional purchases-additional securities purchases,

  • I've been pretty satisfied in the sense that-in the following sense,

  • that purchases do seem to have the desired effects on financial conditions:

  • They tend to ease financial conditions, they tend to lower interest rates,

  • they tend to strengthen asset prices.

  • And those are exactly the kinds of things that monetary policy normally does

  • in order to try to provide stableness to the economy.

  • What has been a bit more uncertain is the effectiveness

  • of the transmission mechanism.

  • And we have seen some developments in the economy

  • that have probably weakened the effectiveness of policy, including, notably,

  • the housing sector, where one would expect-with mortgage rates below 4 percent,

  • one would expect to see more activity than we've been seeing.

  • And the problems in housing finance and so on are part of the reason

  • that the expansionary stimulus is not feeding through as much

  • as we would like to the real economy.

  • I would not say, though, that our policies are-that we're out of ammunition.

  • No, I think we still have tools, but we need to further analyze

  • and study those tools and try to make comparisons in terms

  • of effectiveness, risks, and the like.

  • So I think we still have a process to figure

  • out what is the most effective approach.

  • Does that-yeah, okay.

  • STEVE BECKNER.

  • Steve Beckner, Market News International, Mr. Chairman,

  • with a question about the new forward guidance language in the statement itself.

  • And Peter anticipated one of my questions about the potential danger

  • of it sending a negative signal, but let me ask,

  • What was the rationale for continuing

  • to have forward guidance phraseology instead of just letting these forecasts,

  • these new forecasts of the funds rates, speak for themselves?

  • CHAIRMAN BERNANKE.

  • No, that's a very good question.

  • I might have commented on Zach's question that our two main tools

  • at this point-given that short-term interest rates are close

  • to zero-are asset purchases, but the other is communications.

  • And to the extent that we can communicate that rates will be lower for longer,

  • that will ease financial conditions

  • and be a way that we can affect the state of the economy.

  • And that's part of the reason-other than just a general desire

  • for transparency-that we brought out some of these ideas at this point.

  • The reason that we just don't release the economic projections

  • and leave it at that is because,

  • while the economic projections of future policy rates are an important input

  • to our policy discussions around the table, the decision ultimately is made

  • by the Federal Open Market Committee, you know,

  • which is the voters sitting around the table,

  • and in a process by which we exchange ideas and make arguments

  • and come to a collective determination.

  • So, you know, we don't set the federal funds interest rate

  • by having members send in their vote and not having a meeting;

  • we have a meeting for a reason, which is to talk to each other

  • and try to come to some kind of consensus.

  • So the FOMC will always, in some sense,

  • trump the projections of forward interest rates, but clearly,

  • because the participants and the people around the table are the same,

  • the projections should give significant information

  • about where the FOMC is likely to go.

  • HUGUES HONORÉ.

  • Hugues Honoré with Agence France-Presse.

  • The FOMC stated that global growth has slowed and, of course,

  • that is weighing on financial conditions in the U.S. Arguably,

  • one way that the Federal Reserve could help would be by extending a loan

  • to the International Monetary Fund.

  • There have been other central banks that have been doing

  • that when the government was reluctant to do so,

  • and we have all noted that the Fed was not shy when it came to extending loans

  • to international financial institutions, private banks, and so on that are based

  • or that have subsidiaries in the U.S. Is it something that you could consider

  • if the sovereign debt crisis got worse?

  • CHAIRMAN BERNANKE.

  • Well, lending to financial institutions is part of our mandated function;

  • it's part of our raison d'être to provide a lender of last resort in the case

  • of a panic, as we've done in the recent crisis.

  • Committing funds to the IMF I don't think is

  • within the purview of the Federal Reserve.

  • That's a decision that's made in the first instance by the Treasury

  • and the Administration and in the second instance via approval

  • through the Congress.

  • So I think the appropriate deciders in that case would be the Administration

  • and the Congress, not the Federal Reserve.

  • SCOTT SPOERRY.

  • Scott Spoerry, sir, from CNN.

  • My head's full of questions, but I'm going to try

  • and limit it to two related questions.

  • You're linking your inflation target of 2 percent to the PCE.

  • The PCE is something that hundreds of millions

  • of Americans have no idea what it is; they do know what the CPI is.

  • Can you explain, in layman's terms,

  • something that regular folks might understand,

  • why they should not worry too much when inflation

  • by the-if the CPI is different than the PCE?

  • And the second question is related also to inflation and to the targeting

  • because the Fed's always been a little bit vague in terms of what sort

  • of inflation it would accept, and this is a marked change.

  • Because criticism of the Federal Reserve-criticism of you,

  • but the institution itself has been so intense this year

  • because it's a political year-there are people out there who are going

  • to say "The Federal Reserve has finally just admitted it.

  • Their policy is to destroy 2 percent of the value of my dollars every year."

  • How are you going to respond to those people?

  • And also, could you answer the question about the CPI and the PCE?

  • Thank you.

  • CHAIRMAN BERNANKE.

  • Sure. Well, we chose the PCE index for some, I think,

  • very valid technical reasons.

  • It better allows-better accounts for changes in people's purchasing patterns;

  • you know, when some things become more expensive,

  • people will tend to move to other types of goods and services.

  • That's not accounted for by the CPI, which has fixed weights.

  • It also-the PCE-I think more relevant to the average person,

  • the PCE includes all health-care costs,

  • not just out-of-pocket costs, and that has two benefits.

  • One is, it reduces the share of the inflation index which is tied to housing.

  • And the CPI has a very large share devoted to housing,

  • and a large share of that part of the index is imputed-that is,

  • essentially made-up numbers.

  • So that's one benefit, to keep the-you know,

  • not to put too much weight on the imputed housing numbers,

  • which is part of the CPI.

  • The other is that, even if people are not paying

  • for health care immediately out-of-pocket, they do pay for it,

  • either through taxes or through reduced wages as, you know,

  • increased health-care costs raise insurance premiums for employers.

  • So I think this is probably a better measure of the inflation that's faced

  • by typical consumers than the CPI is.

  • That being said, these various measures-the CPI and others,

  • PCE index and others-move very closely together,

  • and you're not going to have a situation

  • where the CPI is 10 percent and the PCE is 2 percent.

  • There may be a few tenths difference, but, generally speaking,

  • they move very closely together.

  • So, in that respect, I think if people look at the CPI,

  • they should feel pretty comfortable that, you know,

  • that's going to be very close to where the PCE inflation is.

  • On the 2 percent, again, that's where the United States has been for many years.

  • That's where most central banks are around the world.

  • There's a very good reason for it,

  • which is to avoid deflation, which is very negative.

  • I think the argument that, you know, the value of your dollar declines

  • at 2 percent a year is just not really a very good one,

  • unless you're one of those people

  • who does their lifetime saving in the mattress.

  • Most people invest in various kinds of instruments,

  • receiving a rate of interest.

  • And now, it's true, as has been pointed out,

  • that for the moment interest rates are pretty low, but they're still positive.

  • But over a longer period of time, if you-even if you have money in a CD

  • or some other investment vehicle,

  • the interest rate will compensate you for inflation.

  • I mean, the two will be tied together.

  • And so there really shouldn't be, you know-at levels of inflation this low,

  • interest rates should pretty much fully compensate for the losses to savers.

  • But I would reiterate that we are not unaware of the problems

  • that low interest rates cause for savers, cause for pension fund contributions,

  • insurance companies, and other parts of the economy,

  • and we do try to take that into account as we think

  • about other ramifications of our policy.

  • PETER COOK.

  • Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

  • Peter Cook of Bloomberg Television.

  • Two questions, if I could, separate from your role here as Fed Chairman.

  • Two issues in Congress right now, on which your advice might be worthwhile.

  • The payroll tax cut is coming up for debate again,

  • this debate about whether to extend it for a full year.

  • What is your assessment right now of the impact that would have

  • on the U.S. economy if it was not extended?

  • And likewise, what if the Congress were to not implement the 1.2

  • on automatic spending cuts imposed by the failure

  • of the supercommittee-what impact would that have on the U.S. economy?

  • CHAIRMAN BERNANKE.

  • Well, as you know, the Federal Reserve makes it a policy to try

  • to avoid commenting on specific individual tax and spending programs,

  • and I don't have those numbers at hand in any case.

  • But what I would say is the following-is that what I've tried to convey

  • to Congress, and I think many other economists have taken the same view,

  • is that responsible fiscal policy has at least two components at this point.

  • One is, of course, importantly, to achieve fiscal sustainability.

  • And to achieve fiscal sustainability over a long period of time,

  • we need to be acting soon-now would be preferable-to making credible commitments

  • to reducing spending, to improving our programs,

  • to modifying or simplifying our tax code, and so on,

  • so as the ways that will be persuasive to the markets or to the public

  • that over the longer term, over the next 10, 20, 30 years,

  • that our fiscal position will be sustainable.

  • So that's an important thing to do.

  • It relates to the second part of your question.

  • I think it's important to take steps at least to-again,

  • the specific steps are up to Congress, but it's important that action be taken

  • to provide a credible plan to achieve fiscal sustainability.

  • The second part of my recommendation, though, is that we need at this juncture

  • to be sensitive to the effects of whatever policy decisions are made

  • on what is still a very fragile recovery.

  • Again, there are many ways to do that, but I think that should be taken

  • into account as people are looking at policy alternatives

  • in terms of taxes or spending.

  • Thank you.

Transcript of Chairman Bernanke's Press Conference January 25,

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