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JUDY WOODRUFF: New reporting from The New York Times has revealed even more early warnings
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about the seriousness of the coronavirus pandemic and raises questions about whether the president
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and his administration waited too long to take important steps.
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Eric Lipton is an investigative reporter at The Times, and he joins us now.
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Eric Lipton, thank you so much for joining us.
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Your reporting revealed the existence of these so-called Red Dawn e-mails between doctors,
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medical experts in the administration. They were obtained, in part, through the Freedom
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of Information Act request.
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And in one e-mail that I want to ask you about, Dr. James Lawler, who is an infectious disease
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expert -- he served in both the George W. Bush and the Obama administrations -- wrote:
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"We have thrown 15 years of institutional learning out the window and are making decisions
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based on intuition."
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What were these e-mails, and what came out of your finding out about them?
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ERIC LIPTON, The New York Times: Well, what was going on was that there was a group of
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physicians and pandemic experts that, from the Department of Homeland Security, Health
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and Human Services, the CDC, the Veterans Administration, that were consulting and comparing
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notes, that -- and they were trying to make a really critical decision, which was, at
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what point do we go from saying we are going to attempt to contain the infection to which
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it's -- we have community spread, and we now need to move to mitigate its spread through
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actions like social distancing?
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So, at first, the goal was just to contain it, but, at a certain point, you need to say,
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we need to flip the switch and say, schools need to close, businesses need to close.
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These guys were comparing notes to try to figure out, when was the moment that we needed
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to flip the switch? The fire alarm had gone off. Now we needed to mitigate it.
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JUDY WOODRUFF: And from your reporting, what were some of the earliest warnings that the
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president got? And how did he respond to those?
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ERIC LIPTON: Look, I mean, the president's National Security Council -- there were members
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on the National Security Council that in January were quite concerned about what was going
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on in China and were worried that it was just a matter of time before the pandemic would
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be in the United States.
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And the Health and Human Services secretary, Azar, spoke with the president in January
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as well to express his concern about the fact that this was almost assuredly coming to the
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United States and was going to be a public health emergency here.
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The president told him to, you know, calm down, that he was too worried about it. And,
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repeatedly, in that period, while it's true that the president did limit travel by Chinese
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citizens to the United States in late January, there were -- among many of his aides, there
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was a belief that the United States needed to be preparing for the next stage of mitigation.
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And it took weeks too long to get to that point.
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JUDY WOODRUFF: On January the 22nd, in an interview with CNBC, President Trump was asked
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about a pandemic and whether there were worries about it.
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Here's what he said:
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DONALD TRUMP, President of the United States: We have it totally under control. It's one
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person coming in from China. And we have it under control.
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JUDY WOODRUFF: So, what did we know about the coronavirus at that point in late January?
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What did people know in the administration?
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ERIC LIPTON: They knew that it was already here in the United States. They knew that
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it was almost -- it was just a matter of time before it started to spread widely in the
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United States and that, while containment was still important to try to do contact tracing
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to limit the spread, that they needed to be preparing for widespread illnesses.
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That was evident to any public health expert at that point.
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JUDY WOODRUFF: And there is an audio that I want to play for the audience, because,
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on February the 25th, Dr. Nancy Messonnier with the Centers for Disease Control -- she's
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the director of the National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases -- she had a briefing
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call with news reporters in which she issued a warning.
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Here's that.
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DR. NANCY MESSONNIER, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention: These measures might
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include missed work and loss of income. I understand this whole situation may seem overwhelming
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and that disruption to everyday life may be severe. But these are things that people need
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to start thinking about now.
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JUDY WOODRUFF: Just one day later, President Trump said this:
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DONALD TRUMP: And, again, when you have 15 people, and the 15 within a couple of days
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is going to be down to close to zero, that's a pretty good job we have done.
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JUDY WOODRUFF: So, Eric, why was that a key moment in the administration's response?
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ERIC LIPTON: Arguably, that was one of the most essential moments in the whole saga,
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as we look back on it, on history, because that was the moment when they had been a consensus
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among his medical advisers that the United States needed to announce that we needed to
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move to social distancing that's in hot spots in particular.
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And the president was unready to -- unprepared and unready to do that. And, in fact, he lashed
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out at the human -- health and human services secretary, Azar, after Nancy Messonnier made
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that statement while he was in India and on his way home.
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So, what Trump -- President Trump did instead was to wait three weeks before he embraced
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the need for social distancing, and the net result was that there are many more illnesses
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and deaths in the United States.
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JUDY WOODRUFF: So, we are now in -- Eric, in what is called mitigation, this -- these
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widespread closures, all about enforcing social distancing.
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President Trump announced the first social distancing initiative, 15 days to stop the
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spread, he called it, and that was on March the 16th. But how early was this first proposed
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to the president as a solution? And what is known about why he waited to adopt it?
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ERIC LIPTON: It was a month prior to that that essentially a consensus was forming among
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medical experts in the United States government that we now needed to move to mitigation.
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And the thing is there -- it's almost down to a science. Once you have the first death
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from a contagious disease like this, or you have a certain percentage of people who are
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-- who have the illness, you have a window of about one to two weeks to take severe -- significant
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mitigation steps.
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If you don't do it, you're going to -- it's like waiting for a house fire to get from
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being, you know, on the stove in the kitchen to the roof is burning and the structural
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elements of the house are on fire, and then you call the fire department.
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We waited until the roof was burning and the structure was on fire in New York state and
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New York City before we called the fire department. And that was a decision that the president
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made, was to not move ahead with those announcements.
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Now, again, it's the governors' choices as to when to do that, but it's the federal government's
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role to play a leadership -- and to help the governors make the choices by letting them
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know what the public health officials think is needed.
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JUDY WOODRUFF: And we know, Eric, that the lack of testing, the lack of personal protective
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equipment has all -- all of that has also been a significant and ongoing challenge.
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What did your reporting reveal about the delays in dealing with all that?
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ERIC LIPTON: Again, there's two phases in this process, the containment and the mitigation
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phase.
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But during containment, it was evident to any public health expert that this was going
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to spread in the United States. So, as of January, they knew that there was going to
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be illnesses in pockets across the United States. They didn't know how many.
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But they should have known in January that now is the time to spend hundreds of millions
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of dollars to buy face masks and other protective equipment for hospitals. They knew that the
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material in their supplies was expired and there wasn't enough of it.
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Now, they didn't order that stuff until March, but they could have started in January. They
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could have started the process of getting ventilators built in January, knowing that
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they likely were going to need them. That didn't happen until March. And that has severe
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consequences as well.
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JUDY WOODRUFF: Eric Lipton with The New York Times, congratulations on some really extraordinary
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reporting. Thank you.
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ERIC LIPTON: Thank you.